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PREFACE 
It hardly needs to be said that this paper is written by a lawyer and from a 
lawyer's point of view. This fact, however , necessarily means that it is selective, 
firstly in the aspects of its subject that are considered and secondly in the detail 
(especially on non-legal aspects) into which it goes. 
The point is important. It is all too easy, and all too common (especially, 
perhaps among lawyers) for a student of one discipline to attack work in another on 
the ground that it does not produce answers that are required for his purposes, or 
does not deal with its subject in a way ,or to a depth, relevant to those purposes. 
When I· was working in Papua New Guinea, for example, one sometimes heard 
criticism of anthropological work in the fields of land tenure and marriage custom 
on the ground that it did not produce the propositions and categories which lawyers 
and administrators required, or that it dealt with details of no great importance to 
them. Apart from suggesting a degree of intellectual laziness and even arrogance, 
when such criticism goes beyond pointing out actual errors or misunderstandings it 
is, in my opinion, illegitimate. Indeed, some oversimplification of concepts and of 
facts in a "foreign" discipline may be essential if the ends of one's own discipline 
are to be served. 
It is, therefore, only proper that I indicate some limitations that I have placed 
on this paper, and some approaches that I have adopted to aspects of it. 
I have confined myself, on the whole, to constitutional provisions, in the sense 
of formal constitutions and provisions of written laws of the kind that are 
commonly referred to as "constitutional." Constitutional law in this sense is a field 
of particular interest to me; also it is a fair assumption that the matters dealt with 
have such immediate political, ideological or legal importance as to warrant their 
being afforded the highest formal legal status. The point is nonetheless valid ifon 
occasion quite crucial matters are omitted or left for future discussion because 
agreement on them is at the time impracticable: the constitution of Vanuatu is a 
good example of this. 
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The principal exception to the foregoing is my treatment in Part II of the 
Traditional Rights Court rules made by the High Court as required by the 
Constitution of the Marshalls. My justification for this is that those rules 
constitute a lawyer's extension of the principles set out in the Constitution in a 
special field of concern to more than just lawyers. 
I have also attempted to avoid extra-legal value-judgments, except such as I 
base on the inferred purpose of the constitutional arrangements considered. The 
point is expanded upon a little below, and in Part III, but if apparently the intention 
was to involve traditional leaders, ex officio as it were, in the workings of a non-
traditional governmental system, it is not really a fair criticism to point up their 
not being engaged solely in the performance of traditional functions in a traditional 
way. In context, such criticism misses the mark. 
Finally, my treatment of the traditional structure of Marshallese society, and 
my use of the term "traditional," need some preliminary comment, to which I now 
turn. 
The necessarily brief description of traditional Marshallese society given on 
pp. 1, 2 is not intended as a guide to the anthropology or sociology of the Marshalls, 
nor does it pretend to analyze the complexities of, for example, the class structure. 
It is intended to provide only a background against which the constitutional 
provisions, themselves, may be understood. 
As far as the concept of a traditional leadership is concerned, two matters 
are basic to my approach and, I believe, to that of the Constitution. 
Firstly, the Constitution seems to accommodate traditional leaders, but, as 
suggested above, not necessarily in a traditional manner or solely with respect to 
their traditional functions. In fact, the whole idea of "modernized" government is 
non-traditional or possibly even anti-traditional, in a strict sense. 
Secondly, as I use the expression, "traditional leadership" does not refer solely 
to a structure or functions that have existed for centuries or in the common law 
phrase, "from time immemorial." Rather, it includes the modifications made by 
such influences as foreign contact, economic change, centralization of power, and 
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"modernization,"* generally. I therefore employ expressions related to tradition in 
a relative or popular way, as indigenous people themselves now use them, not in a 
strictly scientific sense. 
Before turning to some particular cases relevant to my approach, I ought to 
outline a non-legal principle that I regard as vital to any consideration of social 
structures. In all societies, there are influences tending toward change, and the 
test of the viability of a social structure is how it adapts to (or occasionally 
successfully opposes) such influences. I am far from denigrating a static analysis of 
such structures as at a point in time, but a full, and constitutionally;...relevant study 
must encompass, or at least recognize, their dynamic and evolutive aspects. 
The simple fact that in the Marshalls, as elsewhere, contacts with dominant 
and culturally-alien administrations have involved limitation or prohibition of 
internal warfare as a method of acquiring or holding land, power or prestige 
obviously has had its effect on the position of the indigenous leadership. Similarly, 
the imported judicial requirement that leaders deal "fairly," in the sense of 
procedural fairness, substantially changed the incidents of leadership (see the 
reference in n. 64 below). Such developments do not necessarily alter the basic 
nature and derivation of such leadership, or deprive it of its indigenous or 
"traditional" characteristics. 
Likiep A toll furnishes an example of the development, practically within 
living memory, of a new leadership group. There, the "Owner" families, descended 
from two European adventurers of the late nineteenth century, emerged as local 
leaders. In spite of the facts that their leadership· originated at the earliest in 
about 1887, and that it was not until about 1955 that the "Owners" were recognized 
as equivalent in legal terms to Iroijlaplap (see ·n. 51 below), ther'e is little doubt 
that for practical and legal purposes the "Owners" are now regarded as leaders of a 
traditional kind. Indeed, they are recognized as such in the provisions of the 
Constitution dealing with the Council of Iroij, although, oddly enough, not 
specifically in those relating to the Traditional Rights Court. (It may be that this 
omission is due to only partial acceptance of "Owners" as traditional leaders, 
accommodating their inclusion in a political body such as the Council, but not their 
representation on the Court which is designed to adjudicate traditional rights.) 
*See the references 10 Carl Heine's Micronesia at the Crossroads, n. 197 
below. 
·vii 
Next, the rank or posltlOn of Iroijerik, which is recognized in a number of 
places in the Constitution, is an old one in much of the Marchalls, but its functions 
were largely re-organized and rationalized by the Japanese Administration. 
Nonetheless, it and its functions are today recognized as "traditional." 
Lastly, there is the situation on the "Jebrik's side" of Majuro Atoll (see n. 54, 
55 below). In those parts of Majuro, administrative decisions of the Japanese 
authorities, adopted by the U.S. Administration, vested the functions of the 
Iroijlaplap in a combination (variously and confusingly described by the courts) of 
the Iroijerik the "droulul" (a group or society of land-right holders) and the 
Government. Nonetheless one must regard this arrangement, too, as being in 
practical terms "traditional" rather than "non-traditional" in nature. 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion is to suggest that the mere intrusion 
of foreign elements, even major ones, into an indigenous structure does not 
necessarily change the basic nature of that structure, at least from a legal point of 
view. The important thing, for present purposes, is that leaders arising in an 
indigenous structure, whether modified or not, are likely to have attitudes and 
values related to the society within which that structure evolved, which may be 
different in some ways from those of leaders arising by virtue of a system 
(specifically a Westernized political system) of a different nature. The importance 
of the Constitution of the Marshalls, and the point of this paper, lies in the 
attempts to accommodate both points of view, while giving formal pre-eminence 
(rightly or wrongly) to the latter. Whether the two leadership structures or the two 
points of view can co-exist is a question that only the future can answer. Here I 
am concerned to describe the constitutional arrangements under which the 
experiment in co-existence is set up. 
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Introductory 
In 1979 the Marshall Islands adopted anew, Westminster-type constitution. 1 
In view of the importance of the traditional leadership in Marshallese custom, it is 
not surprising that the Marshall Islands Constitutional Convention gave consider-
able thought to the inclusion of that leadership, in some way, in the constitutional 
arrangements. The result was two institutions to provide for a traditional input: 
the Council of Iroij (chiefs) and the Traditional Rights Court. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the constitutional provisions relating 
to these institutions, of which the provisions relating to the Council are by far the 
fuller. It also includes notes on some analogous institutions and provisions in others 
of the smaller countries of the Pacific. However, I have not dealt with, for 
example, Tonga, Nauru, Fiji and American Samoa, or Hawaii and the French 
territories, mainly because of a lack of knowledge and research on which to base a 
useful comparison. Additionally, the monarchy in Tonga is very much an 
exceptional case (though it may illustrate how an imported institution can become 
"tr adi tional "). 
Although, as noted in the Preface, I have generally avoided making value 
judgments, I have included in Part III some comments on the desirability and 
effectiveness of the involvement of tradition and traditional leaders in a "modern" 
form of government. However, in the first instance this is intended as a study of a 
constitution as it is, and not as an outsider might wish it to be-even though the 
latter approach might raise some fundamental questions otherwise unaddressed. 
As a preliminary it is necessary to have a general understanding of the 
traditional social structure of the Marshalls. As emphasized in the Preface, this is 
not an anthropological or sociological introduction to the Marshalls, but merely a 
minimal sketch placing the constitutional provisions in the context of present-day 
social arrangements. 
The traditional element in Marshallese society is sometimes described as 
feudalistic. 2 There are two social classes into which one is born, the Iroij (those 
of royal blood) and the kajur (commoners), each with its own subdivisions. The 
Constitution itself refers specifically only to Iroijlaplap3 ("paramount chiefs" or 
"kings") and Iroijerik 4 (lesser chiefs) among the Iroij, and to Alab5 (persons who 
lead Kajur lineages and are in administrative charge of particular pieces of land) 
1 
and Dri Jerbal6 (persons who actively work or use the land, among the Kajur. Land 
rights, and traditional authority, are inherited with ownership rights in an Iroj~ 
lineage and user rights in, Kajur lineage, but it should be noted that land ownership 
on the United States or English model is not a part of the traditional land tenure 
pattern? 
Almost every Kajur can hope to become the Alab of his lineage if he lives 
long enough. Succession to Iroij office, say, as Iroijlaplap, depends not only on 
heredity but also on other factors. It is claimed that the Iroijlaplap traditionally 
operated politically with the advice of, or after consultation with his Alabs, who 
were also expected to implement the decisions of the Iroij.8 As in the ideal feudal 
society, relationships tended to be reciprocal, and nowadays the traditional 
reciprocity of rights and obligations is enforced by the courts, which require fair 
and reasonable dealing with "inferiors." 
Although there are of course rules as to status and succession, they are by no 
means inflexible, and are not infrequently bent if not broken. As will be seen, this 
flexibility is recognized in the constitutional provisions relating to the Council of 
Iroij. 
Thus, while succession to the office of Iroijlaplap is in general through the 
maternal ancestor, in some parts male descent has achieved at least de facto 
acceptance. Finally, "Iroij" sometimes seems to refer to the Iroij class, sometimes 
only to the Iroijlaplap. It is not always easy for the layman to determine which and 
I have not always ventured to draw a distinction where it does not seem necesssary 
to do so. 
Two points relating to the Constitution might also be referred to in this 
Introduction: 
The provisions relating to the Council of Iroij and the Traditional Rights 
Court are specially entrenched,9 so that unlike minor provisions they may be 
amended in any significant way only through the protracted process of a 
Constitutional Convention, followed by amendments passed by the legislature (the 
Nitijela) and approved in a referendum.10 It is only fair to add that the same 
applies in relation to other institutions established by the Constitution. 
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Secondly, unhappily the proceedings of the Marshall Islands Constitutional 
Convention that adopted the Constitution are not anywhere available at this time. 
This, of course, creates problems' of interpretation for the student of the 
Constitution. 
PART I. THE COUNCIL OF IROIJ 
1. The Precursors 
Iroij involvement in the legislative process is not a new thing. In 1949 the 
U.S. Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (of which the 
Marshalls is an "entity," along with what are now the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas, the Republic of Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia) 
established an advisory Congress of the Marshall Islands, consisting of a House of 
Iroij (all the "Paramount Chiefs") and a House of Assembly {elected representatives 
of local governments).ll Nine years later the Congress was reorganized into an 
elected uni-cameral legislature, with seats reserved for Iroijlaplap.12 In its final 
pre-Constitution form, the legislature was re-designated the Marshall Islands 
Nitijela,13 and was composed of 24 legislators of whom two Iroijlaplap and four 
Kajur were elected in each of four electoral districts. 
When the 1979 Constitution established the Nitijela of the Marshall Islands as 
the legislature, no separate provision was made for direct Iroij representation, and 
instead the Iroij were specifically involved in the legislative process only by means 
of the consultative and advisory Council of Iroij. The reason for this decision was 
explained to me as follows: 
1. The presence of Iroij in the Nitijela will not allow members to discuss 
matters freely affecting their relations with the Iroij. 
2. The title of Iroij is hereditary and cannot be inherited by someone who is 
not of an Iroij blood. To ask an Iroij to stand election to qualify for a seat in 
the Nitijela can be most embarrassing if he loses an election. Furthermore, 
not only is the Iroij's prestige at stake if he loses in a race, but his traditional 
role as a spokesman of his people can be seriously questioned. 14 
In fact, there are Iroij in the present Nitijela (including the President)15 and in my 
own observations of the Nitijela in action 16 I see little inhibition caused by their 
status. 
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2. Functions of the CounciL 
(a) General. 
The first point to be noted is that the Council of Iroij is advisory and 
consultative and has no formal authority over either the Cabinet or the Nitijela. 
However, the reverse is almost as true: the Cabinet has no authority over the 
Council and the Nitijela is not in a much stronger position. The Nitijela has three 
main functions in relation to the Council: it may appoint a member if the proper 
appointors do not; it determines, by Act, the compensation of members of the 
Council; 17 and it may confer additional functions on the Council. Otherwise, the 
Council is an independent institution. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the power to make laws rests very 
firmly with the Nitijela. 
The primary constitutional functions of the Council can be divided into four-
(A) To "consider any matter of concern to the Marshall Islands, and... to 
.•• express thereon to the Cabinet.,,18 
(B) Functions conferred "by or pursuant to Act." 19 
(C) Power to fill certain vacancies on the Council,20 and to appoint 
d .. . 21 eputles m certam cases. 
(0) Certain non-final powers in relation to Bills.22 
We are immediately concerned only with functions A and B. Function 0 is the 
subject matter of subdivision (b) of this Section, and the following Section 3 of this 
paper deals with function C. 
Although it has not yet been formally used, function A is, at least potentially, 
an important and an influential one. In effect, it establishes the Council as a 
general advisory body to the Cabinet on matters of national importance (which are 
not limited to matters of custom or traditional practice, although such matters 
would obviously be the Council's strong point). The Constitution does not require or 
even suggest that the Cabinet act on or do anything in particular about a Council 
opinion. However, one would think that in a proper case (especially if it dealt with 
a customary or traditional matter) the Cabinet would give such an opinion 
considerable weight. 
Two other aspects of function A might be mentioned. 
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Firstly, the Council is fully competent to initiate advice, but there is nothing 
to prevent the Cabinet from requesting the opinion of the Council where, for 
example, it desired the views or support of the traditional leadership. Oddly, 
perhaps, no provision is made for advice to the Nitijela, although this could be 
provided for by Act under function B, if desired. 
Secondly, legally there seems to be nothing to prevent the Council from 
making its opinion public, or to require it to do so. Whether it would always be 
wise to do so is another matter 0 
Function B, relating to the Council's pursuant powers granted it by 
legislation, has not yet been implemented. This is a matter for the Nitijela itself. 
However, one can see a case for seeking, either directly or through a Committee, 
the opinion of the Council on a Bill under consideration without having to wait until 
after third reading for a formal request for reconsideration (see treatment of this 
in subdivision (b) of this Section, following). I have already encountered cases 
where the Council's views would be useful, but were not requested. On one 
occasion the Ni tijela did, by resolution,23 request the Council "to adopt and publish 
standards for the uniform spelling of Marshallese words .. .. " No significant 
action resulted in the Council. 
An interesting omission, which I assume was deliberate, is that there is no 
specific provision for Council participation in any Convention24 to amend the 
Constitution. A Constitutional Convention-
shall be composed of members fairly representing all the people of the 
Marshall Islands; shall be specially elected by qualified voters; shall number 
at least 10 more than the total membership of the Nitijela ... 25 
There might, however, be a good case for at least Iroijlaplap representation on a 
Convention, and even perhaps for an Iroij electorate-in the social circumstances 
of the Marshalls I doubt if this would offend against the equal protection and 
freedom from discrimination provision, or the access to electoral processes 
provision, of the BiLl of Rights. 26 It will be noted from the passage quoted 
immediately above that the expression used is "qualified voters," not "all qualified 
voters. " 
A B'll d' h C ' , 27 ' d ny 1 amen mg t e onstltutlOn, or proposmg amen ments to a 
Constitutional Convention or to a referendum,28 would come under function 0 of 
the Council next to be referred to in subdivision (b) of this Section. 
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(b) Relations with the Nitijela. 
It has already been pointed out that the Nitijela has little or no control over 
the Council. Here, I concentrate on the converse, the two major areas of the 
relationship between the Council and the Nitijela that are specifically provided for 
by the Constitution which give the Council power over the Nitijela: the power of 
the Council to require reconsideration of Bills, and the Council's functions in 
relation to Bills to declare the customary law. 
The power of the Council to require the Nitijela to reconsider Bills is not a 
power to decide, or even to delay to any significant extent, the disposition of a 
Bill. 29 It does not apply to Appropriation Bills, Supplementary Appropriation Bills 
or Bills that the Nitijela has already reconsidered at the request of the Council, 30 
nor, seemingly, to Bills referred to in n. 29, so that nothing said here applies to 
them. 
The Council has formal access to Bills because the Clerk of the Nitijela must 
send to the Council a copy of each Bill passed on third reading. 3l The Council 
then has one week within which to decide whether or not to do anything,32 and 
until the end of that week, or until the Council sooner decides to take no action, 
the Speaker must delay certification of the Bill. 33 If during that week the Council 
decides that a Bill "affects the customary law or a traditional practice, or land 
tenure, or a related matter" and that the Nitijela should reconsider it, the Council 
may adopt a resolution expressing its opinion and "requesting" the Nitijela to 
reconsider it. On the other hand, it may decide not to adopt such a resolution, or it 
may simply do nothing. 34- If it does request reconsideration, it may at the same 
time make "observations" on the Bill, which could well include suggested 
amendments. 35 It should be noted that the Council can act on any Bill that does 
affect the customary law, etc., and that this may not necessarily be a main purpose 
of the Bill or the intention of the Nitijela. There could easily be a case where the 
possibility that the customary law, etc., might be affected simply did not occur to 
the Nitijela, and in such a situation a request that the Bill be reconsidered and a 
simple amendment made to put this beyond doubt would probably satisfy all 
concerned. 
The Clerk of the Council transmits the resolution and any ilobservations" to 
the Clerk of the Nitijela for reference to the Speaker. 36 This is the end of the 
Council's direct involvement, and ultimately under the Rules of Procedure of the 
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Nitijela it will be informed of the result of its request for the reconsideration. 
Under the Constitution37 the Nitijela may38 reconsider the Bill, and may decide: 
(a) not to proceed with the Bill; or 
(b) to amend the Bill "in any manner that it thinks fit,,39 or 
(c) to re-affirm its support for the Bill without amendment. 
Such a decision by the Nitijela is not subject to further challenge, and unless the 
Nitijela decides not to proceed with the Bill, the Speaker then certifies the Bill into 
law. 40 
In the course of Nitijela reconsideration the Speaker may, 
... in consultation with the Chairman of the Council of Iroij, arrange for a 
joint conference of members of the Council and members of the Nitijela, for 
the purpose of endeavoring to reach agreement about the content of the 
Bill.41 
This conference is not necesssarily a conference of all members of the Council with 
42 . 
all members of the Nitijela, and in fact the Rules of Procedure state that the 
Nitijela members will normally be "the members of the appropriate Standing 
Committee or such members of the Nitijela as the Speaker appoints." The Council 
has as yet no rule on the matter, so presumably this is one of the points to be 
arranged between the Chairman and the Speaker. 
While the conference may be held "for the purpose of endeavoring to reach 
agreement," such understanding will not be constitutionally or legally binding, for 
an Act may be made and a Bill amended by the Nitijela and by no other body, not 
even a joint conference. Nevertheless, such an agreement would be extremely 
influential, especially if it were unanimous or reached by consensus. In fact, given 
the consensual style of government in the Marshalls and the possible reluctance of 
commoners to discuss their relations with Iroij, joint conferences and joint 
committees (see immediately below) might give the Council its best opportunity to 
exert influence. 
Even when the Nitijela adopts a Bill, the Constitution gives the Council of 
Iroij an opportunity to influence its contents. The Constitution provides: 
The Nitijela shaH not proceed further than the first reading of any Bill 
or amendment to a B1l1 43 whlch, in the opinion of the Speaker, makes 
provision for any declaration ... (of the customary law ]... unless a 
joint committee of the Council of Iroij and the Nitijela has been 
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afforded a reasonable opportunity to make a report on the matters dealt 
with in that Bill or amendment, and any such report has been 
published.44 
A joint committee is "a committee of members of the Councill of Iroij and of the 
Nitijela, acting jointly. ,,4 5 
It should be noted that the right to express an opinion on a Bill to declare the 
customary law is limited: only a "reasonable opportunity" must be given. The 
Constitution does not define what is a "reasonable opportunity," but if the joint 
committee meets promptly, and continues its work without unnecessary delays, it 
should probably be allowed to work until it completes its report, or decides that it 
cannot agree on a report. 
This consitutional provision for a joint committee including members of the 
Council is additional to the provision, discussed above, allowing the Council to 
request the Nitijela to reconsider a Bill. Since a Bill to declare the "customary" 
law (as defined in Article XIV, S.l of the Constitution) would certainly be a Bill 
that "affects the customary law or a traditional practice, or land tenure, or a 
related matter" (see above, on Council requests for reconsideration) this potentially 
affords to the Council a second opportunity to press its opinion on such a Bill. 
It would be foolish for the Council to neglect the joint committee procedure, 
and rely only on the second opportunity. In addition, if the Nitijela reconsiders a 
Bill at the Council's request, it would be a strong argument in favor of not changing 
it that the Council had failed to use a joint committee to express its opinion. It 
should also be noted that an opinion of a joint committee may not necessarily be 
the opinion either of the Councilor of the Nitijela; and that a Bill as ultimately 
passed by the Nitijela may not be in the same form as when it was considered by 
the joint committee. 
The Rules of Procedure of the Nitijela provide that the Nitijela members of a 
Jomt committee are chosen in the same way as those of a joint conference, and 
again there are no rules of the Council to provide for this matter. 
A significant gap in the express constitutional powers of the Council is that 
the Constitution is silent on whether it has any function with relation to 
"Resolutions" of the Nitijela. In the Nitijela, a "Resolution" is not merely the 
decision on a motion, but rather the expression is a term of art: 
A resolution is a document expressed to be a resolution, formally 
expressing the decision of the People of the Marshall Islands through 
their Nitijela on some matter of public importance or interest.46 
A Resolution is drafted and disposed of with something approaching the same 
degree of ceremony as a Bill. For example, it usually contains a number of recitals 
setting out the facts on which it is based and a summary of the arguments in favor 
of it; unless the Nitijela orders otherwise it is referred to a Standing Committee 
for report, and if the Committee thinks it necessary, a public hearing; and, like a 
Bill, it is formally certified by the Speaker, countersigned by the Clerk of the 
Nitijela, and sealed with the official seal of the Nitijela. A Resolution is thus an 
important type of measure, and many Resolutions deal with quite fundamental 
matters. The Council of Iroij might well, therefore, have a valuable contribution to 
make in relation to Resolutions--perhaps the more valuable because a Resolution is 
not legally binding. Also, because it is not an interference with the law-making 
process the recognition of the right of the Council to originate Resolutions in the 
Nitijela could in some ways be to the advantage of both, and of the government of 
the country. 
(c) The Council in action 
Up to early 1983, the time this paper was written, the public involvement of 
the Council of Iroij in the governance of the Marshalls has been minimal, in spite of 
the fact that there have been Bills (for example, the comprehensive Local 
Government Bill 198047 and the Property and Traditional Law (Repeal) Act 1981 48) 
which had obvious implications for customary law and traditional practices. On one 
occasion, the Nitijela by Resolution requested the Council to standardize 
Marshallese orthography, but the Council took no action. 
It is, of course, possible that the explanation for this inactivity lies in the 
Council's seeing no reason to act, or (on the more discouraging view) that the 
members have not been particularly concerned to have the Council operate in the 
manner that the 1979 Constitution envisaged. It could, moreover, be due to all or 
any of four practical matters: 
Firstly, there is a lack of interest, of legislative time, or both, on the part of 
the political Jeadership In the Nitijela in relation to the encouragement of the 
Council to perform its constitutional role. That this lack exists certainly seems to 
be true, but what importance one attaches to it depends on the extent to which one 
expects the traditional element to stand on its own feet from the beginning under 
the new constitutional arrangements. 
Allied to this first matter is the lack of provision for administrative and legal 
and other advisory staff for the Council-again, really a matter for the political 
executive to determine, though one in relation to which a strong or concerned 
Council could be expected to take positive initiatives, which it does not appear to 
have done. (In fact, the constitutionality-required office of Clerk of the Council is 
the only senior advisory post of the Council, and not only has it been regarded as of 
no great administrative importance but also changes of occupancy have made it 
almost a part-time office, or at least one in which the interest of the occupant is 
accepted as being primarily part-time.) 
The third is a probable lack of appreciation on the part of the members of the 
Council of its constitutional role and the potential importance of the Council. 
Fourthly, the Council adopted as its rules of procedure the Westernized and 
formalized rules of procedure of the Nitijela with only minor and formal 
amendments, even though this was neither required by nor resulted from the 
Constitution. I cannot but feel that this was due to inexpert advice, but in any 
event the requirement to follow such procedures could well have led to confusing 
the members of the Council and to their failure to exercise their functions as 
contemplated by the Constitution. 
These points are by no means unrelated. A concerned political executive 
would not only provide adequate staff and support, but would attempt to encourage 
an understanding of the constitutional provisions: 49 In turn, adequate staff would 
draw relevant matters to the attention of the members of the Council and would 
devise suitable procedures for their consideration. If these points are truly 
relevant ones, the lesson suggests that it is not enough to place traditional leaders 
in unfamiliar waters, but some instructions or advice on how to survive in them is 
also necessary. 
3. Composition of the Council. 
The Council consists primarily of representatives of the Iroijlaplap. It is 
made up of five "eligible persons" from the districts of the Ralik Chain and seven 
"eligible persons" from the districts of the Ratak Chain. 50 Basically an "eligible 
person" is an Iroijlaplap (or Leroijlaplap), except in respect of Likiep Atoll where 
the equivalent expression "Owner" is used.51 However, a person who is not a 
qualified voter in Nitijela elections, or who is a member of the Nitijela, is 
disqualified. 52 
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The situation in Majuro and Arno, each of which is allotted one Iroijlaplap 
member of the Council, is complicated. 
In Arno, the Japanese Administration attempted to settle a dispute as to 
succession to the office of Iroijlaplap on the eastern side in 1932, but the attempt 
failed and there is still no Iroijlaplap.53 On "Jebrik's side,,54 of Majuro atoll there 
has not been an Iroijlaplap since 1919; his functions have in fact been carried out by 
the Iroijerik on that "side" and the group ("droulul") consisting of those holding 
property rights there, and in law are shared by the U.S. Administration as successor 
to the Japanese Administration.55 On the termination of the Trusteeship 
Agreement, if the matter has not been settled in some other way, the Government 
of the Marshall Islands will presumably succeed to the functions of the U.S. 
Administration, which has consistently refused to exercise those powers or to 
. h· . 56 supervIse t elr executlOn. 
The Constitution also deals with three special instances of membership. 
(a) where in a district there are more eligible persons available for 
membership than there are seatso 57 
(b) where there is no eligible person available. 
(c) where a new person or group of persons becomes recognized as possessing 
Iroijlaplap functions. 
In the first class of cases a selection must obviously be made between the 
eligible persons available. In that event--
(a) the term of office is one calendar year; and 
(b) before the expiration of each calendar year the eligible persons in the 
district concerned are to endeavour to reach agreement58 as to which of 
them is or are to be the member or members. 59 
If agreement cannot be reached by the date of the first meeting of the Council in 
any calendar year, the Nitijela proceeds to make the necessary appointment from 
among the "eligible persons" available.60 In point of fact, the Iroijlaplap member 
for the Mejit Island district for 1980 was appointed by the Nitijela.61 
In the selection of a member (whether by eligibJe persons or by the Nitijela) 
the principle to be observed is that of a "reasonabJe rotation among the eligible 
persons" in each district, but this is not mandatory.62 
In the second class of cases, where for any reason there is no eligible person 
for a district, the Council itself appoints --
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... a person who, in the opinion of the Council, having regard to the 
customary law and any traditional practice, is qualified by reason of his 
family ties to a person who, but for that reason, would have been eligible 
to be a member of the Council from that district.63 
This will obviously take care of a case where the selection of a new 
Iroijlaplap on the death of the former one is delayed,64 but might also take care of 
the unlikely occurrence of a new "Jebrik's side" situation on an atoll. It would also 
apply where the only otherwise-eligible persons are disqualified. 
The third class of case is where there is the emergence of a new person or 
group of persons having Iroij1aplap functions --
If, in any district, a person or group of persons becomes recognized, 
pursuant to the customary law or to any traditional practice, as having 
rights and obligations65 analogous to those of Iroijlaplap, that person, or a 
member of that group nominated by the group, shall be deemed to be 
eligible to be a member of the Council of Iroij as though he were an 
I 001 1 66 r01J ap ape 
This would obviously fit the anamalous cases of Likiep and Majuro if there were a 
change back to a more normal pattern, while the recognition of "groups" would take 
care of the situation of the Iroijerik or the droulul on Majuro should either, or both, 
be recognized in law as having in their sole right the Iroijlaplap functions which 
they already have in practice. 
The seat of a member of the Council becomes vacant if he dies, resigns or 
becomes qualified, and in the case of a member selected under the first special 
class of case discussed above when his 12-month appointment runs out. Vacancies 
are filled by applying, as nearly as may be, the regular provisions. 67 
There is a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman of the Council who are appointed 
by an ordinary majority, in a secret ballot, from among the members. 68 Each 
ceases to hold office on resignation; on the entry into office of a successor; on 
ceasing to be a member of the Council; or on removal from office by a resolution 
of the Council carried by 2/3 of the members present and voting. 69 
Further provisions, which have no parallel for the Nitijela, provide for the 
appointment, in two sets of circumstances and by different procedures, of deputy 
members of the Council. 
1.2 
Firstly, a member who is prevented from attending a meeting of the Council 
or a committee of the Council, or of a joint committee or joint conference, may: 
..• appoint a person who is qualified by reason of his family ties to that 
b 70 b h" d h "71 mem er to e IS eputy at t at meeting. 
This would allow for a system of standing deputies. 
Secondly, if a member is absent from a meeting of the Council, etc., and is 
not represented by a deputy appointed by him, or if the seat of a member is vacant 
... the Council of Iroij may, by resolution, appoint a person who, in the 
opinion of the Council, having regard to the customary law and any 
traditional practice, is qualified by reason of his family ties to that 
member to be his deputy at that meetingJ2 
Except in the case of the deputy of the Chairman, a deputy of a member 
"may perform the functions and shall have the powers, duties and responsibilities of 
that member." The deputy of the Chairman performs the functions of the 
Chairman only if there Is no other member available to perform those functions.73 
Finally, as is the case with the Nitijela, any question that arises concerning 
the right of any person to be a member (or a deputy of a member) is to be 
determined by the Court.74 
4. Procedures of the Council. 
The Council is empowered to determine its own procedures.7 5 The rules of 
procedure that it has adopted simply follow the Rules of the former (pre-
Constitution) Marshall Islands Nitijela and are inappropriate to such an extent that 
they are ignored here. 
The Council meets in regular session during any period when the Nitijela 
meets in regular session, and in special session during any period when the Nitijela 
meets in special session, and remains in session after the Nitijela rises for such 
time as it is necessary for it to deal with any Bills passed by the Nitijela.76 There 
is no specific provision for a recess, but sInce the requirement is only that the 
Council meet "duringll77 Nitijela sessions there is probably no need for one. 
However it is at least arguable that it should not recess unnecessarily during the 
hold-over period after Nitijela sessions: the obvious intention is that it should then 
consider all remaining BilJs passed by the Nitijela (except those excluded from its 
consideration). 
". 
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The Council may also meet in special session when called by the Chairman, or 
by the Clerk of the Council at the request of nine members. It remains in such a 
, "1 h dOd . 78 seSSlOn untl suc ate as It etermmes. 
The quorum, oddly enough, is fixed at six, precisely half of the membership,79 
which at least in theory leaves open the possibility that two competing halves of 
the Council might sit simultaneously! In fact, should there be a considerable 
amount of work to be completed within a limited period, this could be a useful 
provision, though I, for one, would be wary of using it. 
The Chairman presides at any meeting at which he is present, and if he is 
absent the Vice-Chairman presides. If neither is present, the oldest available 
member presides-"oldest" obviously means oldest in years of life, not in office as 
Iroijlaplap or as a member of the Council, and "available" means, I think, not only 
present, but also able and willing to act.80 
There is no provision relating to the number of votes necessary for any 
question to pass the Council except that the member presiding has a vote81 and a 
2/3rd majority of the members present and voting is needed to remove from office 
a Chairman or Vice-Chairman.82 Combined with the effect of the quorum 
provision noted above, this means that a dissident group of four could perhaps 
unseat a Chairman" There is no constitutional provision, as there is in relation to 
the Nitijela,83 dealing with tied votes. 
A quite unusual provision declares that the Council is not disqualified from 
the transaction of business by reason of there being a vacancy in its membership, a 
deputy of a member not having been appointed, or an unqualified person acting as a 
member or a deputy. 84 A quorum of members or deputies, however, would still be 
necessasry. A similar provision applies in respect of the Nitijela, but is limited 
solely to the existence of a vacancy. 85 
5. Miscellaneous matterso 
The Constitution also contains three other significant provisions relating to 
the Council of Iroij. 
Firstly, it requires the compensation of members of the Council to be 
specifically prescribed by Act. 86 This constitutes the only real power that the 
Nitijela has over the Council, and such an Act must be made by the Nitijela by a 
.. 
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a special constitutional process involving a report to the Nitijela by a committee of 
the Nitijela or by some statutory body, the terms of reference of which are laid 
down in the Act. An appropriation by the Nitijela of the necessary funds is also 
. d 87 reqUire. 
Secondly, it provides that, 
Neither the Council of Iroij nor any member of the Council shall be 
subject to any proceeding outside that body, or subjected to any 
liability, civil or criminal, in relation to the casting of any vote, the 
making of any statement, the publication of any document or the taking 
of any other action as part of the official business of the Council of 
I .. 88 rOll· 
The protection would extend to joint committees and joint conferences, as well. 
This provision is practically identical with the equivalent provision for the 
Nitijela,89 but in two ways the protection given to the Council does not extend as 
far as that afforded the Nitijela. Members of the Nitijela are also privileged from 
arrest (except for felony) during sessions and in going to or returning from 
sessions90 - it seems on the face of it that this extends to recesses, and during 
1980-1982 would have given almost year-round protection! In addition, 
Neither the Speaker nor any officer of the NitijeIa in whom powers are 
vested for the regulation of procedure or the conduct of business or the 
maintenance of order shall, in relation to the exercise of any of these 
powers, be subject to the jurisdiction of any court ... , 
except as to habeas corpus and the determination of the qualifications of 
members.91 The first of the omitted provisions probably is of little moment, but 
there is much to be said for extending the second to the Council. 
Concluding the provisions on the Council there is the office of the Clerk of 
the Council of Iroij who, like the Clerk of the Nitijela, is a Public Servant. As has 
already been noted, the Clerk receives Bills from the Nitijela and transmits 
requests for reconsideration to it, and calls a special session of the Council at the 
request of not less than nine members. He is also responsible for arranging the 
business of the Council, keeping a record of its proceedings, and for the provision 
of secretarial services, and may be given other functions by Act or by resolution of 
the Counci1.92 
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It will be seen from this Section and the preceding Section of this paper that 
the constitutional provisions relating to the Council have largely been modelled, as 
far as it was reasonable to do so, on those relating to the Nitijela.It is possible 
that this was merely fortuitous, or simply a matter of drafting style, but, at least 
to me, it seems to emphasize the fact that the Council was envisaged as an integral 
part of the total legislative machinery, and not merely a peripheral on.e. 
6. Comparisons 
While I cannot attribute a specific source or precedent for the Council of 
Iroij, I think that there is merit in referring briefly to some comparable institutions 
in the Pacific, and to some methods in the area bringing traditional influences to 
bear on the governmental process. The value lies not simply in a comparison of 
institutions and specific provisions (which is always useful as a source of ideas), but 
in pointing out some other cases where developments and activities may have 
relevance to the future and the operations of the Council, and which ought 
therefore to be of interest. 
(a) Palau93 
The Constitution of the Republic of Palau provides that: 
A Council of Chiefs composed of a traditional chief from each of the states 
shall advise the President on matters concerning traditional laws, customs 
and their relationship to this Constitution and the laws of Palau. No person 
shall be a member of the Council of Chiefs unless he has been appointed and 
accepted as a chief in a traditional manner, and is recognized as such by the 
traditional council of chiefs of his state. No chief shall serve in the Council 
of Chiefs while serving as a member of the Olbilil Era Kelulau94 or the 
Cabinet.95 
Since the President is the chief executive96 and has a veto power over Bills 
which can be overridden by a 2/3rd majority of each House,97 this gives the 
Council of Chiefs a power that is analogous to (but, since the Council must first 
convince the president to exercise his veto power, more indirect than) the power of 
the Council of Iroij to require reconsideration of a BilL 
As an advisory body to an executive President who is sympathetic to its 
function, the Council of Chiefs might well be in practice a more powerful body 
than the Council of Iroij. As will be seen, the "traditional" councils in Yap State of 
the F .S.M. have on occasion effectively exercised such an indirect power. 
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The Constitution of Palau contains two other provisions98 which, although 
they have no analogues in the MarshaUs, have a bearing on the present discussion: 
Section 1. The government shall take no action to prohibit or revoke the role 
or function of a traditional leader as recognized by custom and tradition 
which is not inconsistent with this Constitution, nor shall it prevent a 
traditional leader from being recognized, honored, or given formal or 
functional roles at any level of government" 
Section 2. Statutes and traditIonal law shall be equally authoritative. In case 
of conflict between a statute and a traditional law, the statute shall prevail 
only to the extent it is not in conflict with the underlying principles of the 
traditional law" 
The first protects the traditional organization, except in cases of inconsistency 
with the Constitution, and specificalIy permits (though it does not require) inputs 
from t into government, and illustrates the importance attached to that structure 
b" the Constitution. The second imposes in effect a fetter on the legislative 
power, the legal significance of which cannot be known until the courts have dealt 
with the matter thoroughly. 
(b) The Federated States of Micronesia 
The Constitution of the F.S.M. contains provisions analogous to those in 
Palau, though their significance is potential rather than actual: 
AR TICLE V. Traditional Rights 
Section 1. Nothing in this Constitution takes away a role or function of a 
traditional leader as recognized by custom and tradition, or prevents a 
traditional leader from being recognized, honored, and given formal or 
functional roles at any level of government as may be prescribed by this 
Constitution or by statute. 
Section 2. The traditions of the people of the Federated States of Micronesia 
may be protected by statute. If challenged as violative of Article IV,99 
protection of Micronesian tradition shaLl be consIdered a compeiling social 
100 . I-- I' purpose warrar,tmg suet, governmenta actIOn. 
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Section 3. The Congress may establish, when needed, a Chamber of Chiefs 
consisting of traditional leaders from each state having such leaders, and of 
elected representatives from states having no traditional leaders. The 
constitution of a state having traditional leaders may provide for an active, 
functional role for them. 
Section 1, it should be noted, does not seem to protect traditional leaders from 
legislative interference as does the equivalent provision in Palau. It was 
supplemented by a resolution lOl of the constitutional convention which is itself 
equivocal, affirming that--
It is not the intention •.. to affect adversely any of the relationships which 
prevail between traditional leaders and the people of Micronesia, nor to 
diminish in any way the full honor and respect to which they are entitled. 
There is therefore no specific constitutional guarantee to the traditional leaders 
nor of their involvement in government, though there is nothing to prevent national 
or state legislative action on such matters. 
Section 2, also, is much weaker than its Palau counterpart, and establishes no 
dominant position for custom and tradition. 
At the national level, at best Section 3 allows the establishment of something 
similar to the Council of Iroij or the Palau Council of Chiefs. An authoritative 
source in the F.S.M. informs me that the provision has not been implemented and 
neither the elected nor the traditional leadership show any great interest in 
establishing the Chamber: 102 
There is another potentially relevant provision. Under the F.S.M. Constitu-
tion each state has in the unicameral Congress one member elected at large and 
others elected on a population basis, and may provide that one seat of the latter 
group be "set aside for a traditional leader who shall be chosen as provided by 
statute.,,103 Representation of the traditional leadership in this way can, however, 
hardly be regarded as more than nominal. l04 In any event, to date it has not been 
implemented. 
(c) Yapl05 
The Constitution of the State of Yap in the F.S.M. was initially the Charter 
of the Yap District of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, granted by the 
former Congress of Micronesia {referred to here as "the initial (Yap) con-
stitution,,).106 It was revised by a State Constitutional Convention ("the revised 
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(Yap) constitution"),107 Although I have been unable to obtain a copy of the 
proceedings of the Convention or other sources explaining the reasoning behind the 
changes made, it is cOl)venient to deal here with both versions of the constitution. 
Both the initial charter and the revised constitution provided for two councils 
of traditional leaders with important functions with regard to legislation, though 
there are significant differences between the formulas by which the functions were 
conferred. As a preliminary, each gave a general statement of function which it 
followed by a specific statement in regard to legislation. 
The initial constitution stated that-
There shall be a council of Pilung and council of Tamol which shall exercise 
legislative, judicial and executive functions which concern tradition and 
custom as prescribed by this charter or by statute,l08 
The formulation in the revised constitution is in terms that are rather more vague 
and general, avoiding the reference to "legislative, judicial and executive" 
functions-
There shall be a Council. of PHung and Council of Tamol which shall perform 
functions which concern tradition and custom" 1 09. 
The revised formulation seems to leave the allocation of precise functions much 
more in the discretion of the legislature than does the earlier formulation, but 
whether it will have this effect in practice remains to be seen. 
As a matter of interest, these councils were set up in 1978 as successors to 
the former Yap Islands council and Outer Islands Chiefs counci1. 11 a 
The powers of the councils with regard to legislation have been both 
extensive and explicit. They were stated in the initial constitution as follows, and 
to all intents and purposes the same formulation was used in the revised 
consti tution: 
A certJfied copy of every bill which shall h&ve passed the legislature shall be 
presented to the council of PHung and the council of Tamol for consideration. 
The councils shall have the power to disapprove a bW which concerns 
tradition and custom or the ro;c or function o~ a L-aditional leader as 
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recognized by tradition and custom. The councils shall be the sole judge of 
the concernment of such bill .... 
The council of Pilung and the council of Tamol may disapprove a bill by 
returning the certified copies of the bill with their objections within thirty 
days after it is received from the legislature. 
A disapproved bill may be amended to meet the councils' objections and, if so 
amended and passed, only one reading being required for such passage, it shall 
b· d' h' 'I III e presente agam to t e counCl s .... 
It is evidence of the constitutional standing of the councils that no power to over-
ride their disapproval was (or is) given, in contrast, with the position of the 
Governor's veto which could (and can) be over-ridden by the legislature. 112 It 
seems that both councils must disapprove for the negation to have effect. 113 
The councils jointly disapproved one Bill to establish a constitutional 
convention (on the ground that it was too soon), and the council of Pilung alone 
three more (with, I think dubious validity, though as the council of Tamol did not 
concur the point is academic), The indirect influence of the traditionalleaclership 
is, however, made apparent by the fact that the Governor vetoed two out of these 
three Bills, taking into account the views of the council' of Pilung. 114 
No attempt seems to have been made in the revised constitution to deal with 
a possible excess of power exercised by the councils in this regard, and indeed it is 
noteworthy that both the initial constitution and the revised constitution make 
each council the judge of the concernment of a bill for the exercise of its power of 
disapproval. l15 
One important power of the councils vanished in 1982. Under both the initial 
constitution and the revised constitution, if the Governor elected is a resident of 
Yap Islands Proper the Lieutenant Governor must be a resident of the Outer 
Islands, and vice versa: to ensure this the initial constitution provided for the 
Lieutenant Governor to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent 
of the appropriate council. l16 Under the revised constitution, the Governor and 
the Lieutenant Governor are elected by the State electorate on a single ticket, 
voting being for the office of Governor and the successful candidate carrying with 
h' h' , 117 1m IS runnmg mate. 
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The initial constitution provided for the membership of the respective 
councils of "traditional leaders of the respective municipalities of" Yap Island 
Proper or Outer Islands, and for the manner of their appointment. 1 IS The revised 
constitution contains no similar provisions and these matters are presumably left to 
the State legislature. 
The initial Yap constitution also had a provision relating to traditional 
leadershipl19 that was to all intents and purposes identical with the F.S.M. 
provision quoted above 120 and needs no further comment. However, this provision 
was not re-enacted in the revised constitution. 
There seems little doubt that, both in law and in practice Yap went, and 
continues to go, far beyond other countries-which may perhaps be attributed to 
"its exceptional conservatism" and the strength of its traditions. 121 Whether the 
Nitijela would, for example, be prepared to tolerate the Council of Iroij's going 
beyond its constitutional functions as the council of Pilung apparently attempted to 
do is doubtful. In the Marshalls the final word would rest with the Nitijela, while in 
Yap such matters could go to the courts, although it does not follow that they 
would be so tested. 
(d) Vanuatu 
The Constitution of Vanuatu establishes a National Council of Chiefs 
"composed of custom chiefs elected by their peers sitting in District Councils of 
Chiefs". 122 The Council--
and 
... has a general competence to discuss all matters relating to custom 
and tradition and make recommendations for the preservation and 
promotion of Ni-Vanuatu culture and languages,123 
may be consulted on any question, particularly any question relating to 
tradition and custom, in connection with any bill before Parliament. 124 
The function of consultation on Bills generally is one that might certainly be useful 
in the Council of Iroij, and could be provided for by Act. 
Constitutionally the National Council is in a weaker position than either the 
Council of Iroij or the Palau Council of Chiefs, in that it has really no direct link 
with any organ of government. But, as nearly always in such cases, it will be the 
practice rather than the constitutional situation that will determine its authority. 
The National CouncLi has, however, one express function of considerable impor-
tance. 
The Constitution declares that" The rules of custom shall form the basis of 
ownership and use of land in the Republic", 125 and requires Parliament to provide 
for a national land law. Before so doing, Parliament must consult with the National 
CounciL 126 Although Vanuatu requires a land law based on custom while the 
Marshalls only allows the Nitijela to declare customary law (including land law), the 
respective functions of the National Council and the Council of Iroij in the matter 
are similar. 
All in all, there are very close parallels between the Vanuatu and the 
Marshalls institutions, and if and when they become fully operational their workings 
should be a matter of mutual interest. 
(e) Western Samoa 
In this discussion, I leave out of account the original joint Heads of State (0 
Ie Ao 0 le Malo) and the Council of Deputies, institu'tions designed to accommodate 
the four highest traditional titles of Western Samoa" 
The Western Samoan approach to the problem of traditional input into the 
legislature was simple, quite different from others already discussed (although 
there may be parallels in the seats for the nobility in Tonga127 and in the members 
nominated to the Fijian Senate by the Great Council of Chiefs128), and to a 
complete outsider regressive by suffrage standards of other countries. 
The approach adopted was simply to provide that almost all the seats in the 
Legislative Assembly were to be filled on the basis of a matai franchise, not a 
" 1 d 1 .. f h" 129 HId umversa , aut, CItIzen ranc Ise. owever, seats were not express y reserve 
in the constitution for the mataL 
There is little basis for direct comparison with other institutions and 
provisions discussed here, and Western Samoa is referred to only to illustrate the 
range of options available, though it is unlikely that this particular approach (which 
has been under legal attack 130) would either be particularly welcome (except 
perhaps in Yap?) or effective elsewhere. 
(f) The Cook Islands 
The Cook Islands has a House of Ariki(s) consisting of Arkiki representing the 
" . 1 d" h 131 vanous IS an s In t e group. 
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The main details of the House are left to be prescribed by Act. Crocombe 
describes the House of Arikis as: 
a body of high chiefs having ceremonial functions as well as an advisory 
role to the government in matters of traditional custom and land. It 
may also discuss any matter referred to it by the House of 
132 Assembly. 
He finishes by way of illustration the submission to the House of Assembly by the 
House of Arikis in 1967 of "proposals to require the approval of landowners before 
subleasing or selling land, and the sharing of profits by landowners," which were not 
adopted. 133 Powles 134 also states that the House of Ariki --
has been active in the clarification of customary law in relation to 
tribes, clans and chiefs, but perhaps over-concerned to re-assert chiefly 
authority. 
However, the primary function of the House of Arikis under the Cook Islands 
Constitution is similar to what I referred to in Section 2(a) of this paper as function 
A of the Council of Iroij --
It shall consider such matters relative to the welfare of the people of 
the Cook Islands as may be submitted to it by the Parliament for its 
consideration, and it shall express its opinion and make recommenda-
tions thereon to the Parliament ." 135 
The Marshalls provision for function A is hardly more than a paraphrase of that 
provision, with the significant difference that in the Marshalls the Council is in this 
respect linked to the executive, while in the Cook Islands the House is linked to the 
legislature. In the Cook Islands the linkage is made closer by provisions for the 
Prime Minister to attend and address the House, for a Minister or a person 
nominated by the Minister to appear when any matter for which the Minister is 
responsible is under consideration, and for a member of the legislature to attend 
invitation. A Minister, person or member so appearing is entitled to take full part 
in proceedings, but not to vote. 136 The provision for the appearance of the Prime 
Minister is, I imagine, a formal and political matter, but provision for the 
appearance of responsible Ministers and other members of the legislature is a 
valuable procedural one that might well be imitated elsewhere. 
Like the Council of Iroij, the House of Arikis may be given other functions by 
Act. However, it has no other constitutional functions. 
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(g) Comments 
It will have been noted that in the examples referred to here, three methods 
of associating the traditional leadership with government have been employed: (i) 
by membership of the legislature, as in the case of the seats that may be reserved 
for traditional leaders in the F.S.M.; (ii) by a special franchise, as in Western 
Samoa; (iii) by the creation of a separate institution, as in all other cases. The 
Marshalls is with the majority in adopting the third method. In the Marshalls, and 
probably elsewhere, the third approach has the advantage of freeing legislators 
from constraints that might be imposed by the presence of traditional leaders in 
their capacities as such. The comments which follow are limited to this third 
approach. 
In all cases except Palau there is a direct link with the legislature, although 
the power of veto possessed by the councils of Tamol and Pilung in Yap is more 
. . h .... hi' I . 137 T akm to an executIve veto t an to partICIpatIOn m t e egIs ative process. he 
linkage is most direct in the Cook Islands, where the legislature may submit 
matters to the House of Arikiso In away, the MarshaUs has the broadest linkage, 
since the Council of Iroij is a sort of consultative House of review but, as in all 
cases except Yap, the ultimate authority of the legislature remains. The 
comparisons do, however, suggest that the Council of Iroij could be strengthened 
and made more useful if it were effectively accorded a more general consultative 
role, like that of the House of Arikis (though by all accounts the latter has been 
made ineffective in practice)" Indeed, closer formal and informal contacts with the 
legislature is desirable if the iltraditional" input is to be effective-in my view, 
Palau and Yap probably go too far in distancing the "traditional" assembly from the 
popular one. 
Some linkage with the executive is also common, though in the Cook Islands it 
is limited to provision for the appearance before the House of Arikis of members of 
the Cabinet and in Vanuatu the matter is left at large. In Yap it was formally 
limited to the selection of the Vice-President. As the Yapese examples suggest, 
however, informal influence on the executive by traditional leaders, acting through 
a constitutional institution, can be great. If what is sought is an institutional 
means of associating the traditional leadership with government, then it seems to 
me that the Marshalls {and in other ways, Palau} has adopted the correct approach 
in specifically giving to the traditional leadership a function of advice to the 
executive" 
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A further point to be noted is that nowhere has a specific right been 
conferred on traditional-leadership institutions to formally initiate legislative 
proposals (although undoubtedly such proposals could take the form of "advice" or 
J 
"recommendations," and in the Marshalls the Council of Iroij can propose 
amendments to relevant Bills). For a society however much tradition-oriented that 
is trying to "modernize" itself, such failure to confer expressly a right of initiative 
just like the lack of final power of disposition is probably a positive factor as it 
tends to lessen the danger of confrontation and the possibility of a back-lash in the 
popular assembly. Such danger might prove to be a real one for a place such as 
Yap. 
An obvious question to be answered in framing provisions for an institution 
representing traditional leadership is whether its competence is to be limited to 
matters relating to custom and tradition. This is the case in relation to the 
reconsideration of Bills (though not in relation to advice to the Cabinet) in the 
Marshalls, and to the veto power of the Yapese councils. In Vanuatu the 
competence extends :to the preservation of Vanuatuan culture and languages. I 
think that the Marshalls' position is the soundest one in principle (especially if the 
right to advise were extended to include advice to the legislature), as it avoids the 
formal sUbjection of the legislative authority of the people to the authority of the 
traditional leadership while at the same time it allows the experience of the latter 
to be utilized. As a practical matter, it is hard to see a true dichotomy between 
the traditional and the non-traditional, since tradition and custom govern a large 
part of social life and relationships in the Pacific Islands (to a degree varying from 
country to country). Again, as the Yap examples suggest, merely legal restrictions 
may be ineffective to limit de facto influence. 
My last point of comparison concerns the manner of selection of the members 
of the bodies representing the traditional leadership. Palau, the F .S.M. and the 
Cook Islands avoid the issue and leave it to ordinary law-although if the Palau 
Council of Chiefs is to be elective the position may be complicated by the 
constitutional guarantee of equality under the law,138 unless the courts are 
prepared to hold that election by peers is a reasonable and proper basis of 
distinction. The same may be true of the specifically elective element of the 
F.S.M. Chamber of Chiefs. The Marshalls, Yap and Vanuatu specifically provide for 
election of members by their peers, though the Marshalls is noteworthy in allowing 
for an evolving leadership structure. 139 
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Interesting omissions from the list of countries referred to in this Section are 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati-the last three being 
constitutionally related in that their constituent documents obviously derive from a 
common Whitehall model, although the three differ from each other in important 
respects. While I do not have sufficient information to form a concluded opinion as 
to why there is no traditional representation at the national level, the following 
considerations appear relevant: 
Papua New Guinea is notorious for the many hundreds of traditional groupings 
that it includes and for its fragmentation, and it could well be thought impossible, 
or unnecessary, to provide for national representation of traditional leader-
ship-even if in the absence of any formalized chiefly system such a leadership 
could be identified otherwise than by conventional elections in some form. The 
same applies, perhaps to a lesser extent, in Solomon Islands, although in that case 
there was a positive decision that "(the) appropriate role for chiefs and other 
traditional leaders is at the provisionial and area government levels,,,140 which is 
I h 'd d f 'h ,,141 more-or- ess w at was provi e or m t e constItutIOn. 
In Tuvalu and Kiribati the position was rather different, as there were 
reasonably well-defined and operating bodies that could be drawn on (although in 
both cases the expense of government was a cause for concern). In fact, in Kiribati 
among the list of questions circulated for public discussion before the constitu-
tional proposals were finalized was the following: 
25. Is there any formal institutional way in which island maneabas could be 
, d 'h I k' ?142 aSSOCIate WIt aw-ma mg, 
In Tuvalu, no such question was included in a similar list, but the island maneabas 
were consulted before the constitutional proposals were settled. 143 The upshot 
was that both countries opted for a procedure under which non-urgent Bills are 
circulated to island councils between first and second readings: this provision is 
specific in Tuvalu,144 while no reason is given in Kiribati for the required delay 
between readings. 145 These procedures are quite informal and not institutional-
ized,146 and the island councils have no direct voice but only the opportunity to 
express their views to, and to put pressure on, their representatives in the 
legislature. They provide an interesting contrast to the Marshallese and other 
similar provisions in that they seem to place a higher rating on the status of the 
elected representative as leader of his people and at the same time to reflect a 
more egalitarian approach. On the other hand, operating as they do before the 
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legislature has had a chance to make a concluded decision they might be more 
effective in getting grass-roots opinion to the legislature, even if in a rather 
unorganized way. Of course, grass-roots opinion and specifically leadership opinion 
are two slightly different things. 
PART II. THE TRADITIONAL RIGHTS COURT 
7. The Tr adi tional Rights Court and the judicial system 
The general judicial system under the Constitution of the Marshalls is quite 
orthodox: it consists of a Supreme Court, which is basically an appellate court; a 
High Court, which is both a court of general jurisdiction and an appellate court 
from subordinate courts; and such District Courts, Community Courts and other 
subordinate courts as are provised by law. While the Traditional Rights Court is, 
like the Supreme Court and the High Court, established by the Constitution and its 
jurisdiction is laid down in the Constitution, it is in most ways an appendage to the 
system rather than an integral part of it. 
The Traditional Rights Court consists of --
panels of 3 or more judges selected so as to include a fair 
representation of all classes of land rights, including, where applicable, 
the Iroijlaplap, Iroijedrik, Alap and Dri Jerbal;. and shall sit at such 
times and places and be chosen on such a geographical basis, as to 
ensure fair and knowledgeable exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by 
this Section. 147 
Its size, membership and procedures are determined by the High Court unless and 
until the Nitijela makes provision for those matters by Act. 148 Rules have been 
made by the High Court. 149 
The jurisdiction of the Traditional Rights Court is treated in the Constitution 
under two heads: a general jurisdiction, and a particular jurisdiction in relation to 
the compulsory acquisition of land rights. In each case, the jurisdiction is ancillary 
to proceedings in the regular courts, and (with a puzzling exception which is 
discussed in the Addendum to this Section) is advisory only, though the 
"determination" or "opinion" of the Court must be given "substantial weight." 
The general jurisdiction is limited to 
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the determination of questions relating to titles or to land rights or to 
other legal interests depending wholly or partly on customary law and 
traditional practice in the Marshall Islands. 150 
There is a problem with the word "titles" in this passage, which is also discussed in 
the Addendum to this Section. The jurisdiction may be invoked as of right by a 
party to a judicial proceeding pending in a regular court, but only on a certificate 
by that court that a "substantial question" within the jurisdiction of the Traditional 
Rights Court has arisen. 151 The T.R.C. Rules provide for the party who first 
applied for the referral of a question to this Court to prepare the order of 
certification and referral, and in the event of unresolved objection from another 
party the order is settled at a contested hearing. 
The resolution of the referred question by the Traditional Rights Court, 
shall be given substantial weight in the certifying court's disposition of 
the legal controversy before it; but shall not be deemed binding unless 
the certifying court concludes that justice so reguires. 153 (emphasis 
added) 
The words emphasized constitute the "puzzling exception" referred to above. 
The particular jurisdiction of the Court relates to the assessment of 
compensation by the High Court in cases of the exercise of the right of eminent 
domain over land rights. The Constitution 154 states that before any private 
property is taken compulsorily the High Court must determine that the taking is 
lawful l55 and make an order for "prompt and just" compensation. It continues -
In determining whether compensation for land rights is just, the High 
Court shall refer the matter to the Traditional Rights Court and shall 
give substantial weight to the opinion of the latter. l56 
It should be noted that there is no reference to a binding effect. 
The result is that, subject to the exception to which I have referred, the 
Traditional Rights Court is an advisory tribunal of a representative kind-repre-
sentative not of the parties, but of the classes of right-holders. The position under 
the Traditional Rights Court Rules is discussed below. 
Before turning to problems of interpretation, I might mention four other 
points which, although not constitutional matters, have a bearing on functions of 
the Traditional Rights Court. 
Firstly, the Trust Territory Code 157 empowers what is now the High Court to 
select assessors to advise it in regard to local law and custom (but not to 
participate in the determination). In regard to matters within the jurisdiction of 
the Traditional Rights Court this provision will presumably be superseded, though it 
could well still apply in other cases involving custom. 
Secondly, Rule 1 of the Special Rules of Civil Procedure (Rights in Land, 
Marshall Island (sic) District) of the High Court of the T.T.P.I. 158 requires a 
plaintiff in effect to set out in his pleadings what action he has taken to settle the 
matter by customary means and to state any relevant custom, and further provides 
that if the proceedings are an attempt to upset or disregard an Iroijlaplap's 
determination, the Iroijlaplap is entitled to notice and to be joined as an additional 
defendant {whether or not he has any other interest in the matter).159 If utilized, 
these and other provisions of Rule I will certainly help clarify the conflict of views, 
as between the parties, on applicable custom. However, the joinder of the 
Iroijlaplap as a party, rather than his appearing as a witness, may make it 
unnecessarily difficult to obtain a completely disinterested panel in the Traditional 
Rights Courts; further, doubts have been expressed to me as to whether the Rule is, 
in practice, fully and properly utilized. 
The third point concerns the applicability of the law of evidence. This is, 
naturally enough, not referred to in the Constitution, but the Traditional Rights 
Court Rules propose, at least as an interim step, that the rules of evidence 
applicable in the High Court will apply.160 Experience in Papua New Guinea and 
elsewhere strongly suggests that this is not enough. For example, in a society with 
an oral tradition of record keeping, the exclusion of hearsay removes from the 
competence of the court some of the better, if not the best, sources of 
information. I suggest that the Traditional Rights Court (and indeed any court 
dealing with matters of custom and traditional practice) should be able to use any 
information or source of information available to it, including hearsay and opinion, 
and relevant authoritiative books and other publications. 
Finally, while the details of the organization of the Traditional Rights Court 
are not laid down in the Constitution they are provided for in the Traditional Rights 
Court Rules. 161 There are to be 12 judges: four Iroij,162 four Alab, and four Dri 
Jerbal. Five judges are to be from the Ralik Chain and seven from the Ratak 
Chain. {These figures are, perhaps coincidentally, the same as the respective 
figures for membership in the Council of Iroij, and are also roughly proportional to 
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the respective total populations-neither of which necessarily provides the correct 
cri terion.) 
Appointments are for five years,163 and are made by the High Court, which 
also has the power of dismissal for any cause for which a judge of the Supreme 
Court or of the High Court may be dismissed. 164 Legal qualifications are not 
required, but judges must be adult citizens of not less than 30 years of age who are 
"knowledgeable in the customs and traditions of the Marshall Islands concerning 
titles, land rights, and related matters.,,165 There is a chief Judge, elected by the 
judges of the Court from among themselves. 166 
For any particular case, there is a panel of three judges (an Iroij, an Alab and 
a Dri Jerbal),. the panels being appointed by the Chief Judge, subject to challenge 
for cause. A challenge is decided by the certifying court unless the grounds for it 
are not ascertained until after the actual referral to the Traditional Rights Court, 
in which case it is decided by the other members of the panel. 167 There is also 
provision for joint hearings by the Traditional Rights Court and the certifying court 
where it would be "in the best interests of justice, and economy in terms of time 
and cost," though in such a case the deliberations and decision of the Traditional 
Rights Court are made separately from and independent of the certifying court. 168 
Finally, there is provision for the Traditional Rights Court to sit en banc: 169 
(1) to secure and maintain uniformity of the decisions of the Traditional 
Rights Court, or (2) where the case involves a question of exceptional 
. 170 lmportance. 
A number of points stand out in connection with the Traditional Rights Court 
Rules. 
Firstly, traditional selection processes, or peer selection, are not used, except 
insofar as they may be involved in the election of a Chief Judge. Rather, selection 
is through appointment by what will probably be for some time an expatriate High 
Court. However, the senior 171 Iroij member of a panel is the presiding judge of the 
panel,172 and in the case of en banc proceedings in the absence of the Chief Judge 
the senior l73 Iroijlap174 member of the Court presides. 175 These procedural 
provisions seem to draw on traditional, rather than Western, precedents. 
Secondly, there is no separate representation of Iroijlaplap as distinct from 
Iroijerik, in spite of the fact that there may be conflicts of interests between 
members of these classes and that the Constitution requires representation of each 
(where applicable). 17 6 
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Thirdly, the total numbers of members is small, especially in the Ralik Chain, 
and in view of possible disqualifications for interest there may be a problem in 
forming intra-Chain panels. 
Fourthly, within each Chain there is necessarily an imbalance between the 
classes of right-holders (although in the Ralik Chain there is no rank of Iroijerik) 
and this may make for problems in obtaining a "fair" representation of all classes of 
land rights" on any particular panel, as required by the Constitution. 
Finally, there seems to be an implicit attitude that the Traditional Rights 
Court is in some way judicially inferior to the "regular" courts, even the technically 
subordinate Courts. This is a matter that might well lower the standing of the 
Traditional Rights Court, and of course its effectiveness. 
ADDENDUM: Two problems of interpretation. 
I referred above to two problems of statutory interpretation: the first, the 
statement that a determination of the Traditional Rights Court is not binding 
"Unless the certifying court concludes that justice so requires," the second, the 
question of the Court's jurisdiction as to "titles." To facilitate their consideration, 
these prOblems are considered in reverse order 0 
The second problem can be stated thus: does the word "titles" refer to titles 
to land, or to traditional titles or to traditional titles of rank and dignity (compare 
the Western Samoa provision quoted on page 34 below giving the Samoan Land and 
Titles Court jurisdiction over "matai titles and customary land")? 
On a matter of the construction of language, it seems to me that the relevant 
provision refers to three subjects of jurisdiction: (a) titles; (b) land rights; (c) other 
legal interests depending on customary law and traditional practice. The question 
of titles to land would thus fall under (b), so that (a) would cover such controversies 
as the long-standing disputes. over the positions of Iroijlaplap on Majuro and Arno 
Atolls. ln 
It is, of course, true that both (a) and (b) could be subsumed under (c), but 
both traditional titles of rank and land rights are sufficiently important to warrant 
special mention. 
It is also relevant that the word "title" does not seem to be used in the 
Constitution in the context of a right to land, whereas "land rights" is defined as -
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any right in any land in the Marshall Islands under the customary law or 
d o ° 1 ° 178 any tra ItlOna practIce. 
In addition, "land rights" is clearly used in the eminent domain provisions of the Bill 
of Rights 179 to include all rights, titles and interests in land. Further, Article X 
deals under the heading "Traditional Rights" both specifically with land tenure and 
related matters, and generally with the customary law. 
The point is an important one, both to individuals and to government. For 
example, membership of the Council of Iroij and of the Traditional Rights Court 
itself, and the right to take part in the election of members of the Council, depend 
on the possession of traditional titles, and under certain local government 
constitutions, some seats in local government councils are reserved for the holders 
of traditional ranks or titles. 
The Traditional Rights Court Rules have adopted the view expressed above 
distinguishing "title" from "land rights.,,180 
The first problem referred to at the beginning of this Addendum is more 
difficult. The relevant provision in full reads: 
When a question has been certified to the Traditional Rights Court for 
its determination under paragraph (4), its resolution of the question 
shall be given substantial weight in the certifying court's disposition of 
the legal controversy before it; but shall not be deemed binding unless 
the certifying court concludes that justice so requires. 
The legal difficulty here is that since a determination of the Traditional 
Rights Court can be made enforceable (i.e., "binding," in one sense) simply by being 
adopted and applied in the ultimate decision of the certifying court in much the 
same way that the opinion of an advisory assessor might be, what is the intended 
additional effect of the provision that such a determination becomes "binding" only 
if "the certifying court concludes that justice so requires"? 
It is arguable that, when the certifying court comes to the appropriate 
conclusion, the determination becomes binding either on all persons, whether 
involved in the proceedings or not (i.e., as a decision in rem), or on the Traditional 
Rights Court itself, on other courts, or on both, in future cases (i.e., as a 'binding 
precedent). However, if any of these alternatives were intended it would have been 
very easy to so state. (From the lawyer's point of view, any such interpretation 
32 
raises peculiar conceptual difficulties that need not be detailed here.) It might be 
noted in passing that the provisions of the Traditional Rights Court Rules, referred 
to above, concerning proceedings en banc, seem to assume that a determination of 
the Traditional Rights Court sitting otherwise than en banc will not constitute a 
precedent binding on the Court as a whole. 181 
It has been suggested to me that the provision may be based on the concept 
that the doctrine of stare decisis (that is, of precedent) has no application in 
customary law, and that disputes are settled ad hoc. On that basis, the Traditional 
Rights Court would consider de novo any question referred to it unless a regular 
court has already concluded that an earlier determination of the Traditional Rights 
Courts should be accorded binding authority because, for instance, justice requires 
finality. Quite apart, however, from the fact that this does not settle the question 
of what the Constitution means by "binding," it also raises the question of whether 
the original certifying court should in effect say: "We approve this determination 
handed down by the Traditional Rights Court and declare it binding," or whether it 
should adopt ab initio the approach that in the instant case justice requires finality 
and that (unless the certifying court rejects the determination) the determination 
of the Traditional Rights Court should be binding for the future. I now turn to this 
question. 
Another possible interpretation is that the conclusions of the certifying court 
as to the requirements of justice is intended to relate to the process of 
determination, irrespective of the result of that process in the particular case. To 
use lawyers' language, the matter is res adjudicata, and cannot again be raised. 
Here, too, there are conceptual problems, as well as linguistic ones. 
There may be other possibilities, but perhaps the provision is not meant to be 
subject to linguistic or legalistic analysis in detail. The general thrust may be 
simply that the certifying court may reopen a question referred to the Traditional 
Rights Court or may elect not to do so, depending on its view of the "justice" of the 
case. 
The problem is clearly one that requires authoritative settlement as soon as 
possible, for it concerns not merely a verbal or theoretical matter, For one thing, 
it raises the whole question of stare decisis in relation to determinations of the 
Traditional Rights Court. For another, it could well affect the technical 
availability of lines of appeal provided for by the Constitution, 
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8. Comparisons and comments. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there is comparatively little in other Pacific islands 
constitutions that I have studied providing a place for the traditional leadership in 
the judicial process. 
In Papua New Guinea, in spite of a declaration of the primacy of "Papua New 
Guinean ways,,,182 the only substantive provision is one allowing the establishment 
of "village courts," that is, 
courts intended to deal with matters primarily by reference to custom 
or in accordance with customary procedures, or both. 183 
Vanuatu went a little further: the National Council of Chiefs could formally 
nominate one judge of the Supreme Court; 184 there is provision for "persons 
knowledgeable in custom" to sit with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, 
and to take part in their proceedings; 185 Parliament is to provide for "village or 
island courts with jurisdiction over customary and other matters and •.. the role of 
186 ... 
chiefs in such courts"; and the Government is to "arrange for the appropriate 
customary institutions or procedures to resolve disputes concerning the ownership 
of custom land.,,187 
The only close analogy to the concept of the Traditional Rights Court is a 
skeletal enabling provision in Western Samoa:-
There shall be a Land and Titles Court with such composition and with 
such jurisdiction in relation to matai titles and customary land as may 
be provided by Act. 188 
The Cook Islands, however, has a not-unrelated provision 189 under which the 
Land Division of the High Court (formerly the Land Court) exercises in relation to 
land on the Islands of Mangaia, Mi tiaro and Pukapuka only the jurisdiction formerly 
exercised by the Land Court "according to local custom," and may exercise a wider 
jurisdiction only at the request of the respective Aronga Mana (traditional 
assemblies, now generally equated to island councils). This is, of course, only an 
indirect conferring of judicial power, but it is unsual in that it appears to allow a 
traditional authority, and customary law, to bar the jurisdiction of a superior court, 
even on a case-by-case basis" 
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The Traditional Rights Court in the Marshalls thus appears to be sui generis 
among the institutions that I have examined for the purposes of this paper. My only 
other comment at this stage (apart from the desirability of clarifying the matters 
referred to in the Addendum to Section 7 ) is that it is perhaps a pity that the 
Marshalls did not go a little further and provide for the Traditional Rights Court to 
supersede the assessor system completely: for example, in the fields of criminal 
law and family law, which under the Trust Territory Code are at least in part 
190 governed by custom, as well as in the general application of custom by that 
Code. 191 The Constitution seems, however, to have prevented such jurisdiction 
being conferred by Act or rules of court. 
PART III-CONCLUSION 
9. General comments. 
Before I go on to more general, and perhaps more basic, matters, it seems 
desirable to point out a major gap (deliberate or accidental) in the provisions 
relating to the Council of Iroij and the Traditional Rights Court-that is, the lack 
of a direct organizational link between the two. 
I would have expected, for example, that the Traditional Rights Court would 
have had a direct responsibility for questions relating to eligibility to sit in the 
Council, but this responsibility (like the equivalent responsibility in relation to the 
Nitijela) is vested in the High Court. Of course, if my interpretation of the 
jurisdiction of the Traditional Rights Court over "titles" is correct,l92 the 
Traditional Rights Court may, if required, have a consultative function. 
It might also not have been unreasonable to have found a role for the Council 
in relation to the membership of the Court, comparable with the former right of 
the National Council of Chiefs in Vanuatu to nominate a judge of the Supreme 
Court, 193 but this is not the case, either in the Marshalls Constitution or under the 
Traditional Rights Court Rules. 
Leaving the matter aside, there are two aspects of the constitutional 
provisions for participation by the traditional leadership in the government of the 
Marshalls which impress me. On the one hand, there is the relative comprehensive-
ness of relationShips, in that in one way or another the traditional leadership is 
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associated with all three branches of government-with the executive and the 
legislature through the Council of Iroij, with the judiciary through the Traditional 
Rights Court. The closest comparison is perhaps the Council of Chiefs in the 
original constitution of Vanuatu. On the other hand, there is a decided feeling of 
tentativeness in the approach of the Constitution to the incorporation of the 
traditional leadership. Also, their participation is peripheral (or perhaps even 
subordinate) in the sense that they have no final or conclusive functions but only 
advisory or consultative ones (if one leaves out of account the possible binding 
force of determinations of the Traditional Rights Court which is referred to in the 
Addendum to Section 7 of this paper). Moreover, their constitutional power of 
initiative is fairly slight. Whether this second aspect of the functioning of the 
traditional leadership is good or bad is debatable. 
If one believes (as, for example, the framers of the Tonga and Western Samoa 
constitutions appear to have done) that the traditional leadership should retain, in 
the context of a specifically "Western" form of government, something 
approaching or analogous to its traditional place, then it is presumably a bad thing. 
If on the other hand, the intent is to combine elements of two systems, I for one 
think that in some ways it is not a bad thing at all. As I have suggested above, 
politically there are advantages for the Council of Iroij in the fact of being to some 
extent distanced from the legislature (although, as already noted, there is room for 
a widening of its functions), and there are similar advantages for it in not being 
given executive functions within a non-traditional executive structure. 
As far as the Traditional Rights Court is concerned, I think it would be 
undesirable for it to be permitted to make decisions as to the Constitution or non-
customary law, but at least in respect to constitutional issues it seems that its 
special constitutional position might be recognized by allowing it to state a case to 
the High Court. Outside this area, however, I feel that there is considerable scope 
for strengthening the jurisdiction of the Court, at the very least by making its 
determinations binding for the purpose of the proceedings to which they relate 
(perhaps unless "justice" requires otherwise), and by allowing for an appeal direct to 
the High Court from it. Especially if customary law and traditional practices are 
considered to be evolutive, it seems also that some express provision should be 
made for the precedential effect of its determinations. However, as in the case of 
the Council of Iroij, there is much to be said for avoiding a direct clash between 
the traditional and the "modernizing" legal institutions, and particularly for 
avoiding the deadening effect of a backward-looking judicial institution. To the 
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. 
extent that the traditional structure, personified in the Council of Iroij, is expected 
to adjust-in a Marshallese and not a foreign-oriented way-to changing circum-
stances, this constitutes another reason for some link between the Council and the 
Court. 
10. Is a traditional input desirable? 
Throughout the preceding discussion I have assumed that, at least for some 
Pacific countries, provision for a traditional input into government is desirable and 
perhaps politically necessary, and that this· might well be provided for in the 
constitution itself. It remains to look a little more closely at these assumptions, 
which have been questioned, as for example, by Guy Powles. 194 However, pursuing 
this discussion should be some considerations that I believe to be fundamental. 
Firstly, the question whether or not a role for the traditional leadership 
should be provided, or allowed for, is emphatically one for each people (or for their 
representatives) to decide in the light of their perceptions of their needs and 
circumstances, perceptions that the outside consultant or adviser~ no matter how 
sympathetic, can only partially share. The outsider can best limit himself to 
estimates, based on comparative and historical knowledge, of how such a role might 
function and how effective it might be, and of the possible results. Even the 
assessment "good" or "bad" should primarily depend on and relate to indigenous 
perceptions, not the perceptions and values of the outsider. 
Secondly, it is of course possible that the outsider may be in a better position 
to appreciate the possibility of incompatibili'ty between an imported constitution or 
political institution and an ongoing or proposed modification of a traditional 
institution. However, here again the resolution of such a conflict ought to depend 
on the perception of the people involved. It is all too easy for the outsider 'to 
proceed as if the resolution can only be unidirectional, that is, adverse to the 
"traditional" institution. As seen by those within the culture, the choice may well 
be real and difficult. 
Thirdly, it is possible that accommodation of the traditional element may 
represent only a stage in development, and thus may be only transitory. But it is 
again too easy for the outsider to take this for granted. After all, it is only a few 
years since "everyone" knew that the advantages of individualized over traditional 
land tenure systems were so self-evident that if the people were given the 
opportunity to make an informed choice, the traditional systems would wither 
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away. Moreover, the fact that an institution is apparently transitory is not of itself 
decisive on the question, whether it is at any given time sufficiently important to 
be specifically provided for, by constitution or otherwise. 
Finally, at the time of the framing of a constitution there may well be a real 
political need-if only a temporary one-to accommodate the traditional leader-
ship in order to "get the constitution off the ground," even at the risk of some 
insti tutional incom pa tibili ty. 
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that there may be a tendency to 
romanticize and idealize traditional elements. This is especially true of outsiders 
to a culture. Traditional elements undoubtedly have both positive and negative 
aspects and all must be weighed. 
The issues raised by the assumptions that provision should be made for 
traditional leadership can be rephrased as two questions: should there be an 
institutional link between the traditional leadership and the "new" political and 
legal structure? And, are the two fundamentally incompatible? The answer to 
neither question is within the province of a "Western" legal consultant, or to a large 
extent within the true competence of lawyers as such. It is therefore with 
diffidence that I venture an opinion, 
The first question involves a political matter and depends on the realities of 
the situation at the time and in the place. It is, for example, idle to have a given 
subject governed in theory by an imported system of law while in practice it is 
regulated by custom and tradition; it follows that if there is a living and adaptive 
system of customary law it ought to apply in its proper field,195 and ought to be 
administered at least in the first instance by people used to it and to its ideological 
background. Here, it cannot be too much emphasized that a particular ethnic 
background does not imply a particular ideological understanding. For example, it 
. used to be a common, and I think often a true, statement that African and Indian 
lawyers trained in the English common law were "more English than the English." 
In the political and administrative fields the position is much the same. If the 
fact of the matter is, and will continue to be, that the traditional leadership 
structure plays a large part in the regulation of society, then it seems that there 
are three immediate possibilities: to oust it, as by revolution; to ignore it, and 
thereby to accept the fact that its operations will continue sub rosa or 
clandestinely; or to accommodate it in some way. 
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Whether the answer is that an institutional link between the traditional 
leadership and the new structure is desirable, or that it is not, is primarily a matter 
of local political judgment. If there is to be such a link, whether it should be 
established in the constitution, allowed for by the constitution, or simply not 
prevented by the constitution, is to some extent a matter on which the lawyer, as 
such may well offer advice. 
As to the question of whether the traditional leadership and the new structure 
are incompatible, my answer is twofold. On the one hand, if the imported 
structure, or a particular part of it, is specifically intended to operate in the same 
way as its foreign counterpart and to produce the same results, then there may be 
incompatibility. On the other hand, if, for example as I am told was the case in the 
Marshalls, a foreign structure is chosen because of its resemblance to the 
traditional one,l96 and if that means that the imported structure is not expected to 
operate in precisely the same way, or to produce precisely the same results, as the 
foreign model, then the incompatability may be more superficial than real. But to 
the extent that real incompatability does exist, it is the importation that should be 
changed. Also, as is rather well brought out by Senator Carl Heine of the 
Nitijela,197 the compatability in question is more an ideological one than an 
operationally institutional one or even one of constitutional law, and ideologies 
differ from person to person, time to time, and place to place. Particularly in 
relation to ideological distinctions, outsider value-judgments are likely to be less 
than useful. 
The question of whether any institutional link with tradition and the 
traditional leadership should be provided for in the constitution is partly political 
and partly a matter of legal ideology concerning the form and contents of 
constitutions. Here there seems to be no uniformity of approach: for example, the 
constitution of Kiribati is silent; F.S.M. allows a role to be given to the traditional 
leadership; Solomon Islands requires one to be given, but structured below the 
national level; the Marshall Islands prescribes considerable structural and func-
tional detail; Palau prescribes certain aspects and preserves others. 
I described the question as partly a political matter for two reasons: in 
general, the decision as to what goes into a constitution at a particular time and in 
a particular place is in the first instance one to be arrived at by the politicians; and 
the specific decisions as to the desirable role (if any) for the traditional leadership 
and of tradition, and as to their importance as of the time and place, are of a 
political nature, at times, even caught up in the confrontation of organized 
poli tical parties. 
Legal ideology is involved because a drafting approach is inherently 
incorporated into every constitution, as is well exemplified in Papua New Guinea: 
an ideology partially underlying that constitution is that anything of real 
importance in government should be dealt with in the constitution. My own view is 
that it is better (especially in a situation of development and change) for a 
constitution to be limited in extent to the essentials, this without prejudging what 
are the essentials in any given case. For example, while it is well within the 
"English" constitutional tradition, much of the details of procedures and so on that 
are included in the Marshalls constitution concerning the Council of Iroij could, it 
seems to me, well have been left either to Act or to the Council itself, without 
taking away from the importance or the functions of the Council. I might add that 
one gets a strong impression that the legal ideology involved is frequently that of 
the consultants, advisers and draftsmen rather than that of the politicans and the 
people affected (though I am not sure how far that was in fact the case in Papua 
New Guinea). 
Powles, in a paper that surveys all the constitutions discussed here (except 
Yap) as well as some other Pacific constitutions, obviously disapproves of, or at 
least is pessimistic about the results of, the formal involvement of the traditional 
leadership in government, except at the local level and then in such matters as 
dispute-settlement. His conclusion is --
In the light of what is seen as the inevitable sweep of egalitarian 
thinking, the perpetuation by statute of a leadership system based upon 
elements of inherited status or "class distinction" would appear short-
sighted and anachronistic. To supplement chiefly with statutory power 
seems contrary to the interests of both systems-and of greater public 
participation in the decision-making which affects daily lives. As an 
institution competing freely with government and commerce, however, 
independent chiefship contributes to a wider and more interactive field 
for the exercise of power, the expression of opinion and mobility in the 
h o f ° ° 198 ac Ievement 0 asplratlOns. 
Powles sees "conceptual conflicts and erosion of values implicit in any fusion 
of chiefly and Western systems.,,199 His main problems apparently lie in the 
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difference between the natures of chiefly and "Westernized" power; the dependent 
or reciprocal nature of the relationship between a chief and his group; and the fact 
that dependence by a chief on an outside source of authority might undermine that 
relationship. At best, Powles sees only a temporary role for chiefship. 
Leaving out of account the "inevitable sweep of egalitarian thinking"-I for 
one would be reluctant to assert that such a sweep would necessarily do away with 
chiefship, any more than it necessarily has with monarchies-it seems to me that 
Powles' argument may have some force if chiefs are called upon to exercise 
executive power granted by an outside source and to enforce non-traditional values, 
or enforce them in a non-traditional way. The same would apply to the exercise of 
judicial authority, if non-traditional rules are applied or non-traditional procedures 
used. 
However, it seems to me that the argument as summarized above does not 
take account, sufficiently, of a number of factors. Conditions will vary from 
country to country, depending on the depth of the social (as distinct from the legal) 
entrenchment of chiefship. As suggested above, eyen if chiefship is a transitory 
institution there may well still be a place for it in a constitution during the 
transitional phase. Then, too, it seems to me that an advisory or consultative role 
as in, for example, the Marshalls or Vanuatu may not involve the same dangers or 
considerations as an executive role, as outlined above, nor maya judicial role of a 
traditional nature applying customary law.;.;! 
Powles assumes that the imported institutions of government are expected to 
operate in the same way, and presumably in accordance with the same value-
systems, as they do elsewhere. This may well not be true, or at least may well not 
continue to be true. On the other hand, it may well be that chiefship may develop 
and adjust, as have some of the successful monarchies. If so, the governmental 
system as a whole may develop into something quite different from that of the 
source of its imported institutions. 
Finally, a very real danger to the chiefship lies in the possibility of an elected 
poli tical leadership supplanting, totally or effecti vel y, the traditional leadership. 
This is what the Marshalls and Vanuatu, for example, attempt to guard against. 
I am, therefore, rather more optimistic than Powles in that I believe that in 
some countries, such as the Marshalls, an opportunity may be provided for the 
traditional leadership to contribute to government while itself developing-if in the 
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given case it is capable of doing so. If it cannot evolve in this way, it will become, 
at best, irrelevant. 
But Powles and others have sounded other important practical warnings. 
* It is futile for a constitution to attempt to freeze the traditional 
structure, and to introduce it directly into a "modern" governmental 
structure in the expectation that it will continue to function in the new 
environment exactly as it did in the old. 
* A feed-back effect is to be expected-the functioning of traditional 
leadership in a non-traditional structure is likely to change the manner 
in which it operates in the traditional system. 
* The imposition or acceptance of alien "modernized" procedures is likely 
to impose too much of a burden on traditional leaders, and to undermine 
• both their understanding of and their effectiveness in their new roles. 
These are dangers to be guarded against or (if possible) to be allowed for. 
The point of the experiment in the Marshalls is that it is an experiment, which 
could be as valuable to other countries in its failure as in its success. What is 
necessary is a study, in considerable depth, of the actual workings of this and 
analogous constitutional experiments elsewhere in the Pacific. 
At5PENDIX 
Notes 
GENERAL NOTES 
1. Unless otherwise stated, a reference to an Article (Art.) or a Section (S) is a 
reference to an Article or a Section in the 1979 Constitution of the Marshall 
Islands. 
2. A reference to the name of a country or state, possibly followed by a reference 
to an Article, Section, etc., is a reference to the constitution of that country or 
state, and, as the case may be, to the Article or Section therein. 
"F.S.M.": The Federated States of Micronesia - Yap, Truk, Kosrae (Kusaie), 
Ponape. 
"S.O. ": Secretarial Order, made by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and 
having legislative and constitutive effect. 
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"Rules of Procedure": The Rules of Procedure of the Nitijela, adopted 1 
September 1981. 
"T.R.C. Rules": The Traditional Rights Court Rules (see n. 14-9). 
"T. T .P.I.": The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the 
United States. 
"T. T.C.": Trust Territory Code. 
"T. T.R.": Trust Territory Reports. 
NOTES 
1. For a general description of the 1979 Constitution, see my "The 1979 
Constitution of the. Marshall Islands: A Hybrid?" (The Parliamentarian, 
October 1982, Vol. LXI, No. 4-, p. 230) and "From Washington to Westminster: 
The Constitution of the Marshall Islands" (Seminar Paper, Department of 
Law, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, 
December 1981). In a paper entitled "The Constitution of Niue and the 
Marshall Islands: Common Traits and Points of Difference"(P. Sack (Ed.), 
Pacific Constitutions ,The Australian National University, Department of 
Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra, 1982; p. 97) Alison 
Quentin-Baxter, who was primarily responsible for most of the drafting of the 
Marshall Islands Constitution, gives a valuable view of it as at the time when 
it was written, and of the reasons for many of its provisions. 
2. See, for example, Jatios v Levi (ITTR 578 (1954-), at p. 587. 
3. The feminine form is Leroijlaplap, and the title carries the same status as 
Iroijlaplap. Incidentally "laplap" is sometimes spelled "lablab," and either 
form may appear as a separate word. 
4-. The Constitution uses the form "Iroijedrik." 
5. The Constitution uses the form "Alap." 
6. "Dri jerbal" is usually translated "worker," meaning worker of the land," but 
the word does not seem to have the connotation "laborer," still less "peon," 
"serf," or even "peasant." 
7. See, for example, Jatios v Levi, Ope cit. 
8~ If this is how the constitution-makers saw the Iroij/ Alab relationship, it is 
irrelevant for present purposes whether or not it is an accurate description 
except to .. the extent that any error of perception may, in practice, distort 
their intentions. And see Quentin-Baxter, note 1, above, pp. 103-4-. 
9. In constitutional usage, a provision is "entrenched" if it can be amended only 
in a special way (e.g., on the votes of a special majority, or with special 
notice of lengthened proceedings). A provision is said to be "specially 
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entrenched" if its amendment is made more difficult or more protracted than 
that of other provisions of the constitution. The "depth" of entrenchment 
provides some indication of the relative importance attached to the various 
provisions of a constitution at the time of its adoptiono 
10. Art. XII, 5.2(1),(2). 
11. See Norman Meller, The Congress of Micronesia (Honolulu, University of 
Hawaii Press, 1969), pp. 54, 155. 
12. Norman Meller, The Congress of Micronesia, pp. 136-9 
13. The term "Nitijela" was the traditional name of the group of Alab who met 
with their Iroij, referred to above. 
14. Personal communication from a former Minister of the Marshall Islands. See, 
also, the paper by Alison Quentin-Baxter referred to in n.l, at p. 107 et seq. 
15. The eligibility of Iroijlaplap to sit in the Nitijela is implied by the 
disqualification of any such person from the Council of Iroij. Art. III, 5.1(7). 
16. As Legislative Counsel and Special Consultant to the Nitijela since 1980. 
17. Art. III, 5.4. Such power of the purse could constitute a major form of 
control over the Council, albeit a clumsy one. 
18. Art. III, S.2(a). 
19. Art. III, S.2(c). 
20. Art. III, 5.1(5). 
21. Art. III, 5.9(2). 
22. Art. III, 5.3; Art. X, 5.2(3). 
23. Nitijela Resolution No. 16/1979. 
24. The original Constitutional Convention had special seats for 11 Iroij and one 
"Owner" (see, as to "Owner," n. 51 below)-District Law No. 23-32-2, S.2(b). 
25. Art. XII, 5.4(2). 
26. Art. II, Ss, 12, 14, respectively. 
27. Art. XII, 5.3. This applies only to minor amendments (See Art. XII, 5.2(2),(3)), 
and strictly speaking such amendments are not made "by" Bill, but "shall be 
considered and disposed of as if they had been proposed by Bill"; for present 
purposes the result is the same. .. 
28. Art. XII, 5.4(5),(6). Although the Constitution is not specific on the point, it 
seems that this would not be true of Bills for referenda on amendments 
submitted by a Constitutional Convention (Art. XII, 5.4(4)), where the Nitijela 
is given no discretion. 
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29. In the present pattern of sittings of the Nitijela, however, with short sittings 
and long recesses, the practical effect of a request by the Council for 
reconsideration, given either after the Nitijela has recessed sine die or to the 
call of the Speaker, could be a delay of six months or more in the final 
disposition of a Bill. 
30. Art, III, S.3(8). 
31. Art III, S.3(1). It might be noted that a "Bill" does not become an "Act" when 
passed by the Nitijela, but only on certification by the Speaker that the Bill 
has been properly passed. (Art. IV, S.21(3». 
32. Art. III, S.3(2). 
33. Art. III, S.3(4); Art. IV, S.21(1); Rules of Procedure, S.92(b). 
34. Art. III, S.3(2). The word used is "requesting," but since the Nitijela must deal 
with the request, if it wants the Bill to go ahead the word means, in practice, 
"requiring. " 
35. Art. III, S.3(3). 
36. Rules of Procedure, S.93(8). 
37. Art. III, S.3(5), (7). 
38. In this context, the word "may" must, for practical purposes, be given the 
force of "shall", unless the Nitijela has such little interest in its Bill that it 
does nothing at all, for the effect of Act III, S.3(4) is that if the Council 
requests reconsideration the Speaker cannot certify the Bill into law until the 
Nitijela has either amended the Bill or reaffirmed it. The Rules of Procedure 
set out detailed rules in this regard (see Part VIII, Division 4-Special 
Provisions Relating to Re-consideration of Bills Requested by the Council of 
Iroij-Ss.92-94), which for practical purposes guarantee that positive action 
will be taken. 
39. This seems to suggest that an amendment could bi= made that had nothing to 
do with the Council's action, or even with custom or tradition. The Rules of 
Procedure, however, limit amendments to matters arising out of the Council's 
resolution and observations (Rules, S.93(2». 
40. Art. III, S.3(9); Art. IV, S.21(1); Rules of Procedure, S.90(1). 
41. Art. III, S.3(6). 
42. Rules of Procedure, S.51. 
43. This reference to "readings" of an amendment seems odd-I am not aware of 
any such procedure. 
44. Art. X, S.2(3). 
45. Art. XIV, S.1. 
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46. Rules of Procedure, S.95(1). 
47. P.L. 1981-2. The importance of custom was illustrated by the fact that the 
people of a number of local government areas insisted that their Alabs (and 
on occasion Iroij) should be ex officio members of their local government 
councils. The point was not raised on the Bill nor by the Council of Iroij, 
however, but in discussions as to the contents of the local government 
constitution. 
48. P.L. 1981-18. Although I was away from the Marshalls at that time, my 
understanding is that the impetus for this Bill arose out of the confused 
situation on "Jebrill's side" of Majuro Atoll, and that its wider implications 
were missed both in the Nitije1a and in the Council of Iroij. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
As, for example, turning the present talk about paying Council members full-
time salaries because members of the Nitijela are compensated on a full-time 
basis-. -pointing up how this fails to grasp the constitutional role of the 
Council. 
The Ralik ("sunset" or western) and Ratak ("sunrise" or eastern) Chain are the 
two chains of atolls and islands that make up the Marshalls. 
Likiep Atoll was acquired in "fee simple" (properly, under German law, by way 
of absolute ownership) in about 1887 by three Europeans, Ingalls, Capelle and 
deBrum, but Ingalls sold out to the others afterwards. The Capelle and deBrum 
families (who are now assimilated as Marshallese are known as "Owners", and 
since at least from about 1955 their land rights on Likiep have been legally 
recognized as being the same· (with some minor variations) as those of 
Iroijlaplap, subject to agreements of those concerned and to action of the 
Government (see Monna v Capelle, M.I. District Civil Action No. 49 (1955). 
Art. III, S. 1(7). 
See (LainlH v Lajuon (1 TTR 113 (1954» at pp. 114-5); Labina v Lainej (4 TTR 
234 1964 at pp. 243-4. 
That is, the land formerly under the authority of Iroijlaplap Jebrik (sometimes 
spelled "Jebik") Lukotworok, who died in 1919 and has not been replaced. 
For discussion of the situation on "Jebrik's side", see in particular Levi v 
Kumtak (1 TTR 36 (1953» and the same case on appeal under the name JatlOs v 
Levi (1 TTR 578 (1954) at pp. 583-4). 
See Joab ,I. v Labwoj (2 TTR 172 (1961) at pp. 174-175), and dispatch DTG 
1725402 August 1960 from the High Commissioner, T.T.P.I., quoted there. 
There is multiple representation of a district in the Ralik Chain (excluding 
Ujelang), where 4 Iroijlaplap represent the district. 
No procedure is laid down, nor is it suggested that one should be laid down, and 
in particular there is no requirement of a formal ballot. It seems that the 
intention was that the selection would be agreed by consensus. 
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59. Art. III, 5.1 (4)(a), (b). 
60. Art. III, 5.l( 4 )(c). 
61. Nitijela Resolution 18/1979. There was no similar resolution for 1981 or 1982. 
62. Art. III, 5.l(4)(d). 
63. Art. III, 5.1 (5). 
64. As had happened in the case of Lainlij v Lajuon (1 TTR 113 (1954». On the 
case of Arno Atoll, " ... except for a very few years there has been no iroij 
lablab over the eastern Arno lands in question from 1932 until ... (1971)" and 
later (Bina v Lajuon (5 TTR 336 (1971), at p. 372). 
65. It cannot be too much emphasized that in traditional society Iroij not only have 
rights, but also have obligations which will be enforced by the Courts. In fact, 
as a matter of law the modern responsibilities of Iroijlaplap may be' more 
onerous than their original ones, and their prerogatives less. 5ee for example, 
the discussion in Labina v Lainej (4 TTR 234 (1969». 
66. Art. III, 5.1(3). 
67. Art. III, 5.8. 
68. Art. III, 5.5(1),(2). Appointments are made, before the dispatch of any other 
business, at the first meeting in each calendar year and, as required, at the 
first meeting after the occurrence of a casual vacancy. 
69. Art. III, 5.5(3). 
70. Both this provision and Art.III, 5.9(2) refer to qualification, without stating 
what the deputy must be qualified for, or to do, or alternatively what the 
qualifications are, although 5.9(2) relates the question to "customary law and . 
. . traditional practice" which 5.9(1) does not. For the lawyer this raises 
problems of interpretation that the Constitution itself does not resolve. For 
what it is worth, my conclusion is that the deputy must be a person who would 
be acceptable, in the traditional context, to stand in for general purposes, 
qualified by the proviso that the Council must pay greater heed to "customary 
law and ... traditional practice" than must the member himself (who, after 
all, is making a personal choice) . 
71. . Art. III, 5.9(1). 
72. Art. III, 5.9(2). 
73. Art. III, 5.9(3). 
74. Art. III, 5.1 (8). 
75. Art. III, 5.7(4). 
76. Art. III, 5.7(1). 
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77. I realize that "during" may mean either "throughout" or "at some point in", but 
in context the latter seems to me the more likely meaning. 
78. Art. III, S.7(2). 
79. Art. III, S.7(3). The quorum may include a deputy or deputies. 
80. Art. III, S.6. I have already witnessed a case where, I think because of diffidence, 
the oldest member refused to make herself available. 
81. Art. XIV, S.3. 
82. Art. III, S.5(3)(c). 
83. Art. IV, S.15(7). 
84-. Art. III, S.10(2),(3). 
85. Art. IV, S.15(9). 
86. Art. III, S.4-. 
87. Art. IV, S.19. 
88. Art. III, S.l 0(1). 
89. Art. IV, S.16(4-). 
90. Art. IV, S.16(2) 
91. Art. IV, S.16(3). 
92. Art. III, S.l1. 
93. I understand that "Palau" is the official name in English, "Belau" in Palauan. 
94-. That is, the bicameral legislature of Palau. 
95. Palau, Art. VIII, S.6. 
96. Palau, Art. VIII, S.1. 
97. Palau, Art. IX, S.15. 
98. Palau, Art. V. 
99. The F .S.M. Bill of Rights. 
100. The expression "compelling social purpose" is not used in Art. IV. Explanations 
provided to the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional Convention related this 
expression to the U.S. doctrine on constitutionally-guaranteed rights (see the 
forthcoming book by Norman Meller on the 1975 F .S.M. Constitution). 
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101. Resolution No. 32 of the Micronesian Constitutional Convention, adopted 24 
October 1975, before the fragmentation of the T. T.P.I. The resolution is to be 
included with all copies of the Constitution "so that the intent of the 
Delegates may be evident to all who read the Constitution." See TTC, Vol. 2, 
p. 319 (1980 Edn.). -
102. Personal communication, 20 November 1981. 
103. F.S.M., Art. IX, 5.11. 
104. The original allocation of seats on the basis of population was: Kosrae 
(Kusaie)-l; Yap-I; Ponape-3; Truk-5 (Public Law 1 Cl, 5.7, 1978). This 
followed F.S.M. Art. XV, 5.6. 
105. I am grateful to Daniel R. Foley, Legislative Counsel and Peter P. Fagal 
Chugrad, Assistant Legislative Researcher, First Legislature of the State of 
Yap, for much of the information on which this material is based. 
106. 3 TTC Ch. 4 (1980 Edn.). 
107. Mimeographed, 1982. 
108. 3 TTC S. 333( 1980 Edn.) 
109. Revised Yap Constitution, Art. III, 5.1. 
110. 3 TTC 5.381 (1980 Edn.). 
Ill. 3 TTC SSe 309,310 (1981 Edn.); revised Yap Constitution, Art. V, SSe 16 17. 
112. 3 TTC 5.311 (1980 Edn.); revised Yap Constitution, Art V, 5.19. There was 
(and is), however, provision for the legislature on a single reading, to amend a 
disapproved bill to meet the councils' objections, but the amended bill is 
subject to further disapproval (3 TTC 5.310 (1980 Edn.); revised Yap 
Constitution, Art. V, 5.17). 
113. Powles (Legal Systems of the South Pacific, International Association of Law 
Libraries, 8th Course on Law Librarianship, Australia 1981, Paper No.8, p. 5) 
is of the opinion that either council can veto. The Legislative Counsel to the 
Yap Legislature takes, with me, the other view, which is confirmed as to 
practice by the examples given in the text below. The point is not clarified in 
the revised constitution. 
114. Personal communication. 
115. 3 TTC S. 309 (1980 Edn.); revised Yap Constitution, Art. VI, 5.16. 
116. 3 TTC 5.315 (1980 Edn.). 
117. Revised Yap Constitution, Art. VI, 5.2. 
118. 3 TTC SSe 334, 335 (1980 Edn.). 
119. 3 TTC S. 360 (1980 Edn.). 
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120. F.S.M., Art. V, S.l-See pp. 17,18 above. 
121. See S. A. de Smith, Microstates and Micronesia (New York: New York 
University Press, 1970), pp. 162-166, esp. at p. 163. 
122. Vanuatu, Art. 2(1). 
123. Vanuatu, Art. 28(1). 
124. Vanuatu, Art. 28(2). 
125. Vanuatu, Art. 72. 
126. Vanuatu, Art. 74. 
127. Tonga, Arts. 59, 60, 63. 
128. Fiji, S.45(1)(a). 
129. Western Samoa, Art 44(1), which was amended to reduce the proportion of 
"non-matai" seats. The matai vote was in fact provided for in the Electoral 
Act 1963, and see n. 130 below as to recent judicial decisions on the relevant 
provisions. 
130. Pacific Islands Monthly, Vol. 53, No.3, March 1982, p. 19. 
On 8 March 1982 the Chief Justice of Western Samoa held invalid the 
provision of the Electoral Act 1963 that laid down the matai franchise on the 
ground that they contravened the equal protection and anti-discrimination 
provisions of the Constitution (Art. 15) (In the Matter of the Electoral Act 
1963 and The Judicature Ordinance 1961: Saipa'ia Olumalu and Others v The 
A ttorney-General and Others, mimeographed, 1982). This thoroughly Western-
ized decision was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeal (The South Sea 
Digest, 24 September 1982, p. 3). From the point of view of the "English" 
lawyer the decision on appeal is particularly interesting because it was based 
largely on the proceedings surrounding the adoption of the constitution. 
131. Cook Islands, Art. 8. 
132. Ron Crocombe (Ed.), Land Tenure in the Pacific (Melbourne, O.U.P., 1971), p. 
87, n.9. 
133. Crocombe Ope cit., p. 66. 
134. Guy Powles, "Traditional Institutions in Pacific Constitutional Systems: Better 
Late or Never?" (P. Sack (Ed.), Pacific Constitutions, The Australian National 
Universi ty, Department of Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra 
1982, p. 345, at p. 357). 
135. Cook Islands, Art. 9(a). 
136. Cook Islands, Art. 11. 
137. It has been suggested that my reference to the Yapese vetoes as being 
executive rather than legislative in nature is misleading, for such a veto is part 
of the legislative process itself. Possibly because my legal background derives 
from England rather than the United States, I draw a distinction between three 
different kinds of "veto", of which the following are illustrations: 
In Australia, legislative power is vested in "a Federal Parliament, which 
shall consist of a Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives" (Australia, 
5.1) The "Royal Assent" is therefore part of the process of converting a Bill 
into an Act, although it is for practical purposes a formality and is given by 
the Governor General (on behalf of Her Majesty) as decided by the Federal 
political executive. 
In Tuvalu, "Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Tuvalu" (Tuvalu, 5.57), Parliament consisting only of elected 
representatives (Tuvalu, 5.46) That legislative power "shall be exercisable by 
Bills passed by Parliament and assented to by the Governor-General on behalf 
of Her Majesty" (Tuvalu, 5.58(1», the Governor-General acting in this matter 
as directed by the Tuvaluan poi tical executive. Similarly, in the Republic of 
Kiribati the legislative power "shall be exercised by Bills passed by... [the 
Maneaba ni Maungatabu, i.e., the legislature by and out of which the president 
and the ministers are chosen and of which they remain members] and 
assented to by ~he Beretitenti, i.e., the president"] . 
In all such cases, "assent" is clearly part of the process of making a law, 
even though the power (if any) to withhold assent is sometimes, erroneously, 
called a "veto" power. 
The third category is quite different. It was common in British and 
Australian dependencies, for example, for the legislative power, exercisable by 
"Act", to be conferred on a local legislature, subject to "disallowance" by the 
Crown, a Governor/Administrator or sometimes a Metropolitan Minister. This 
is a true veto, in that the law is made and is nullified ex post facto. There is a 
similar situation in the Marshalls at the moment, as under U.S. law (but not 
under the Constitution of the Marshalls, which is subject in this regard to the 
relevant U.S. law) an Act of the Nitijela can be "suspended" (i.e., vetoed or 
nullified) by the U.S. High Commissioner for the T.T.P.I. In cases in this 
category the "veto", being exercised independently of the legislature, is as I 
see it, "executive" and not "legislative", in nature. 
138. Palau, Art. IV, 5.5. 
139. See pp. 11-14 above, 
140. Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference, London, September 
1977 (Lond., H.M.S.O., Cmnd. 6969), p. 12, pars. 55,56. 
141. Solomon Islands, 5.114(2). 
142. Report of the Constitutional Convention 1977, App. C, p. 22. Island maneaba 
are traditional island assemblies. 
143. Tuvalu House of Assembly: Report of a Committee to Ascertain the Views of 
Tuvaluans on the Constitutional Provisions Best Suited to an Independent 
Tuvalu (Funafuti, February 1977): the questionnaire is App. A, p. 15. 
f)1 
144. Tuvalu, S.60(2). The provIsIOn is made more effective by the Rules of 
Procedure, which require a report of the debate on the first reading of a non-
urgent Bill to be sent to island councils for comment, and for their comments 
to be considered at a separate stage in proceedings (called a "reading", which 
is a rather confusing misnomer) (Rules, S.21). 
145. Kiribati, S.68(3). 
146. But as to Tuvalu, see n. 144 above. 
147. Art. VI, S.4(1). 
148. Art. VI, S.4(2). 
149. "Rules Providing for the Size, Membership and Procedures of the Traditional 
Rights Court" (referred to here as the "T.R.C. Rules"), dated 9 September 
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150. Art. VI, S.4(3). 
151. Art. VI, S.4(4). 
152. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 8. 
153. Art. VI, S.4(5). 
154. Art. II, S.5(4). 
155. Art. II, S.5 lays down certain criteria for lawfulness. It includes a prohibition 
on the taking of customary land rights: "if there exist alternative means, by 
land fill or otherwise, of achieving at non-prohibitive expense the purpose to 
be served by such taking" (Subs.(3». 
156. Art. II, S.5(7). 
157. 5 TTC S.353 (1980 Edn.). 
158. Until replaced by Act or rules of court made under the Constitution, the 
T. T.P.1. rules of procedure apply in the constitutional courts. 
159. The lawyer will notice that Rule 1, while adjectival in form, is substantive in 
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160. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 23. 
161. T.R.C:Rules, Rules 1-4, 19. 
162. The T.R.C. Rules specifically state "Iroij members", whereas the Constitution 
(Art. VI, S.4(4» specifically, though not exclusively, refers to Iroijlaplap and 
Iroi jedrik. 
163. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 3. 
164. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 4. 
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165. T .R.C. Rules, Rule 2. 
166. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 10. 
167. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 11, 12(b)(A). 
168. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 13. 
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Rules, Rule 19(a» 
170. T .R.C. Rules, Rule 19(b). 
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172. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 12(b). 
173. See n. 171 above. 
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175. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 19(c). 
176. Art. VI, S.4(1). 
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v. Levi (1 T.T.R. 578 (1954», and as to Arno Labina v. Lainej (4 T.T.R. 234 
( 1969». 
178. Art. XIV, S.1. 
179. Art. II, S.5. 
180. T.R.C. Rules, Rule 5. 
181. Art. VI, S.4(5). 
182. P.N.G. Preamble, National Goals and Directive Principles No.5. 
183. P.N.G. S.172(2), and S. Sch. 1.2(1). 
184. Vanuatu, Art. 47 (4). This was the original provision, but by the Constitution 
First Amendment Act (1980) it was replaced by a provision for the 
appointment of members of the judiciary, other than the Chief Justice, to be 
made on the advice of a Judicial Service Commission. 
185. Vanuatu, Art. 49. 
186. Vanuatu, Art. 50. 
187. Vanuatu, Art. 76. The analogy with Rule 1 of the Special Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the Marshalls (see p. 29 above) is obvious. 
188. Western Samoa, Art. 103. 
189. Cook Islands, Art. 48(3). 
190. 1 TTC S.103 (1980 Edn.); 39 TTC Ss.4,55 (1980 Edn.). 
191. 1 TTC S.102 (1980 Edn.). 
192. See the Addendum to Section 7 of this paper. 
193. Vanuatu, Art. 47(4). But see n. 184 above. 
194. See n. 134 above. 
195. I am not denying that it may be necesssary, for legal or non-legal purposes, to 
abolish or alter customary rules, or that it is possible that a customary legal 
system may lose its vitality and usefulness: see, for example, John Goldring, 
The Constitution of Papua New Guinea (The Law Book Company Limited, 
Sydney, 1978) Ch. 11 passim and esp. his quotation from Jain on pp. 168-9. 
There is also an important distinction to be drawn between custom as law and 
custom as a source of law or of legal ideas (compare P.N.G., S.Sch.2.3(1) (c». 
196. See my "From Washington to Westminster ... " (n.l above), Section 8. 
197. Carl Heine, Micronesia at the Crossroads (The University Press of Hawaii, 
Honolulu, 1974) passim, esp. under index references to "modernization" and 
"tradition". Heine emphatically opts for "modernization" with itsconse-
quences, but does not necessarily equate "modernization" with the rejection or 
abandonment of a distinctively Marshallese identity. 
198. See the reference in n. 134 above. 
199. Ibid., p. 10. 
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